Presumptive Deference and the Role of Expertise on Questions of Law in  Canadian Administrative Law by Bowman, Cheryl Laura
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESUMPTIVE DEFERENCE AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW 
IN CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHERYL LAURA BOWMAN 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER 
 
 
 
 
 GRADUATE PROGRAM OF LAW 
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL,  
YORK UNIVERSITY,  
TORONTO ONTARIO 
 
 
 
 
APRIL 2019 
 
 
 
© CHERYL LAURA BOWMAN 2019 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Administrators in Canada are presumptively accorded deference on questions of law. This 
deference is grounded largely in expertise, a pragmatic justification for deference. This thesis 
examines the relationship of expertise to other practical justifications for deference and to 
legislative intent. This thesis questions (i) whether assumptions about administrative expertise 
are grounded in administrative realities; (ii) whether deference to expertise has a meaningful 
nexus with legislative intent; and (iii) whether heavy reliance on expertise leaves meaningful 
room for judicial review on questions of law within reasonableness. I conclude that the doctrine 
of deference relies too heavily on presumptions about the expertise of administrators on 
questions of law. Deference of this nature risks allowing administrators to deviate from 
legislative policy, privileging administration over democracy. Where the courts apply 
reasonableness, expertise also risks becoming a presumptive explanation for why a decision is 
reasonable.  
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Introduction 
The doctrine of deference in Canada applies to the judicial review of administrative decisions, 
including those involving questions of law. The doctrine was developed beginning in the 1970s 
as an attempt to correct for excessive judicial intervention in administrative decisions in favour 
of economic actors and in opposition to the administrative state. The fundamental legal 
justification for deference was that it respected legislative intent to delegate decisions to 
administrators and to allocate final decisions to administrative tribunals rather than courts. On 
this theory, administrators were granted these powers by the legislature because they had 
superior expertise and specialized abilities to handle complexity. Administrators were accorded 
deference on questions of law because they were seen to have a superior understanding of 
legislative intent on the technical nuances of statutory terms, broader policy contexts, and 
legislative purpose. 
Since Dunsmuir was decided in 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada has increasingly narrowed 
opportunities for correctness review on questions of law. However, it has struggled to provide a 
consistent, principled basis for why deference should be accorded in these circumstances. 
Current doctrine focuses heavily on tribunal decision-making and does not provide principled 
reasoning for the application of deference to the diverse array of administrative decision-makers 
that are subject to judicial review. Increasingly, the Supreme Court relies on practical 
justifications for deference on questions of law, such as expertise, that are divorced from 
legislative intent. Further, the Supreme Court has struggled to explain how decision-makers can 
act reasonably and how courts should identify a reasonable decision on questions of law.  
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Administrators are diverse and many are charged with day to day decision-making implementing 
policies directed at protecting collective interests such as risk managing environmental harm, 
health, safety and socio-economic equality. These policy areas may be highly controversial and 
contentious and may involve regulating powerful actors. Administrators implementing such 
areas are charged with widely varying degrees of discretion in balancing economic benefits with 
other social values, or alternatively ensuring that other social values are determinative. While 
some administrators have broad and flexible public interest mandates, many have more 
constrained policy mandates designed to ensure that health, safety or the environment are 
protected. For example, an administrator has a very narrow mandate when charged with 
determining if there is scientific evidence sufficient to show that there is “reasonable certainty 
that no harm to human health, future generations or the environment will result” from an 
exposure to a pesticide.1  
Similarly, an administrator has a narrow mandate when determining if a person does not meet the 
express requirements for Canadian citizenship, such as being born in Canada after February 14, 
1977.2 While such mandates inevitably involve some level of discretion, these administrators are 
not given mandates to make broad determinations of good policy, or balancing collective and 
economic interests. The legislature has made many of the important policy decisions, and the 
role of the administrator is primarily to implement them. In other cases, administrators make a 
more hybrid determination that has some element of both. For example an administrator might 
need to make factual or scientific determinations of whether a project is likely to cause “adverse 
                                                 
1 Pest Control Products Act, SC 2002, C26, s. 2(2), s.7-8. 
2 Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29, s.3. 
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environmental effects” as well as making more subjective or policy-driven decisions such as 
determining if those effects are “significant” or “justified”.3 While I refer to deference doctrine 
more generally in this thesis, my interest is primarily in addressing how it applies to questions of 
law in circumstances where the legislature has spelled out – at least to some extent – the 
objectives and policies which are to be achieved by administrative decisions. I’m concerned with 
the theoretical problems that arise where the legislature has given the administrator direction on 
desired policy outcomes by either setting out articulate legislative purposes or objectives, or has 
provided a relatively narrow decision-making mandate, or both.  
This practical concern arises from my own decade of practice experience both advising 
administrators and litigating against them on a wide range of issues, most frequently on issues of 
environmental protection. As deference doctrine has expanded into questions of law, it has the 
potential to encourage administrators to ignore, sideline or even undermine their legislative 
mandates. I use this observation to inform my analysis, however an empirical examination of this 
through caselaw or practical research in public administration is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
My focus is instead on how deference doctrine makes assumptions about administration, and 
how those assumptions influence the doctrine. I argue that if these key assumptions are wrong, 
the doctrine can have potentially adverse effects.  
While often the legislative mandates of administrators relate to protecting vulnerable interests, 
such as workers or the environment, my concern is not specifically with whether any one policy 
                                                 
3 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, C19, s 52, s.31. 
  
4 
agenda, such as protecting the environment, is enforced by the courts. My concern is with the 
deeper question of whether current deference doctrine helps or hinders public and democratic 
control over administrative decisions. In my experience, judicial review, while imperfect, is often 
the only practical means by which administrators can be held accountable to the legislature’s 
delegated mandate, both from the inside – through legal advice, and on the outside through 
litigation. The expansion of deference on questions of law is considered here, while 
acknowledging it is only one small part of a potentially much broader matrix of social trends 
towards the concentration of social, political and economic power in Canada. Courts and 
legislatures provide an important, if flawed, means of mitigating such trends, where the law 
permits.  
Current deference doctrine tends to presume that administrative decision-makers operate largely 
in broad policy making arenas and has been developed predominantly in the tribunal context. 
This thesis however takes as a starting point that not all administrators have the institutional 
frameworks of a tribunal, nor do they all have broad or poorly defined decision-making 
mandates. This thesis attempts to examine whether deference doctrine is capable of consistently 
holding administrators accountable to legislative mandates. 
The focus of my analysis of deference on questions of law is broad. In this thesis I refer to 
“administrators” as including a diverse array of decision-makers ranging from Ministers to lower 
level bureaucrats, not only to boards and tribunals. Further, this thesis is not interested in the 
question of administrative interference with individual rights and economic liberty. Instead the 
thesis is more concerned with how the courts might police the boundaries of administrative 
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public policy mandates to ensure that legislation protecting collective interests can accomplish 
the policy objectives that the legislature intended.  
This thesis questions (i) whether assumptions about administrative expertise are grounded in 
administrative realities; (ii) whether expertise has a meaningful nexus with legislative intent; and 
(iii) whether heavy reliance on expertise leaves meaningful room for judicial review on questions 
of law within reasonableness.  
I begin my thesis in Part 1 by undertaking an examination of the theory behind deference and 
administrative decision-making. This section sets out what the assumptions behind the doctrine 
of deference are and sets out some of its practical limitations. In Part 2 I examine a selection of 
Supreme Court of Canada cases in more detail, in light of my earlier critiques. In Part 3 I 
examine how the assumptions behind the doctrine of deference influence the application of 
deferential reasonableness. 
This thesis uses a conventional doctrinal approach to analysing deference doctrine, and takes as a 
starting point the approach used by leading common-law scholars in administrative law. 
However embedded within the common-law jurisprudence and scholarship are certain 
entrenched assumptions about how administrators behave, their characteristics and their 
achievements. I attempt to incorporate conclusions and theories of social scientists concerned 
with the study of public administration.4 By doing this, I attempt to diversify viewpoints on 
                                                 
4 While I do not purport to apply a critical theory or critical legal studies approach, some of the 
scholarship I review includes critical theorists and is inspired in part by work such as Lorne Sossin “The 
Politics of Discretion: Toward a Critical Theory of Public Administration” (1993) 36(3) Can Pub Admin 
364. 
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administrators, their role, societal function and how administration relates to broader issues of 
political power. I use this diversity of viewpoints to test the strengths and weaknesses of the 
assumptions made by common law jurisprudence and scholarship. 
The thesis concludes that the post-Dunsmuir doctrine of deference relies too heavily on 
presumptions about administrators that may not be true. The doctrine relies heavily on presumed 
expertise to justify a strong presumption of deference on questions of law. Reliance on presumed 
expertise, particularly in relation to questions of law, is problematic because it is nearly 
impossible to rebut and does not necessarily reflect administrative realities. Where the courts 
apply reasonableness, expertise also risks becoming a presumptive explanation for why a 
decision is reasonable.  
I conclude that the presumptions behind the doctrine of deference are flawed and an approach 
that respects diversity in legislative intent is necessary. Finally, this thesis argues for the 
importance of a more positivist approach on questions of law, and a more purposive approach to 
reasonableness, in order to ensure that statutory objectives are met by administrators.  
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Part 1 – Background: Historical Origins of Deference 
Deference doctrine arose in a specific historical and jurisprudential context. Any critique of it 
must grapple with its origins. To understand why deference is accorded to administrative 
decision-makers and what the assumptions underpinning deference are, it is important to 
understand the theoretical and practical problems that deference doctrine was attempting to 
solve. Exploring this history permits a better understanding of the central concerns of courts and 
scholars as deference doctrine was developing. It also facilitates and highlights potential 
weaknesses and oversights in the doctrine. The early debates around the growth of discretion in 
the administrative state help us to understand the political and social tensions about what kind of 
legal power is considered legitimate and where the source of the legitimacy arises. These debates 
help to contextualize the jurisprudence on deference. 
History of modern deference doctrine 
Dicey and the Rule of Law 
At the turn of the 20th Century the administrative state was expanding in the common-law world. 
In this early period, the potential for the administrative state to interfere with economic and other 
freedoms was a growing concern. Scholars like Albert Venn Dicey were highly critical of the 
growth of the administrative state and emphatic that “rule of law” could only be preserved by an 
independent judiciary.5 Dicey’s practical and normative concern was to prevent political and 
administrative actors from interfering with the private legal rights of individuals. Dicey was 
                                                 
5 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution , 7th ed (London: Macmillan, 
1908). 
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concerned that administrators might do so without legislative endorsement or judicial 
supervision.6  
In his classic treatise, Dicey focused largely on two issues: the first was the supremacy of 
legislative function, the principle that courts could not intervene in the legislative process and 
that the executive could not ignore duly passed laws. Second, Dicey was interested in executive 
accountability to the ordinary courts.7 
 
Dicey identifies these principles as fundamental to the English legal tradition and contrasts them 
with continental legal traditions, which afforded administrators and the executive more 
discretion. Dicey critiques continental legal traditions as despotic due to the ability of the 
executive to bypass ordinary laws and the inability of the courts to hold administrative and 
executive decision-makers accountable to those laws. Dicey famously denied that 
“administrative law” was part of the English tradition and described French administrative law as 
a historical response to various French constitutional crises. These crises, he argued, related to a 
desire for a more powerful executive in relation to courts and legislatures. This power 
relationship facilitated significant and timely law reform by the executive without intervention 
from legislatures and courts.8 Dicey described this situation in disparaging terms as “the 
                                                 
6 Ibid at 54-56, 60, 183-184, 189-191, 198, 344. 
7 Ibid at 344. 
8 Ibid. 
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traditional desire, felt as strongly by despotic democrats as despotic kings, to increase the power 
of the central government by curbing the authority of the law Courts.”9 
Dicey has been identified as a legal positivist due to his conviction that judges were well 
positioned to objectively interpret laws. Dicey’s belief was that judicial supervision could 
prevent administrators and the executive from evading the law or operating outside the law. 
According to a common interpretation of Dicey, the principles of legislative supremacy and rule 
of law operated to exclude a role for the administrative state in making and interpreting the law 
in the English tradition.10 In this context, Dicey described the reluctance of English Courts to 
interfere in parliamentary proceedings11 and the unavailability of judicial review remedies to 
quash legislation.12 Dicey’s description of the rule of law turns on the inability of bodies other 
than courts to enforce the law in ways that interfere with the liberty of persons or property.13 In 
other words, Dicey believed that courts protected citizens from arbitrary persecution by the 
bureaucracy or the executive. Dicey contrasted this role of the courts with his view of other 
countries where: 
..wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, 
…discretionary authority on the part of the government must mean 
insecurity for legal freedom on the part of its subjects.14 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. Of course the historical and jurisprudential accuracy of Dicey’s account of the state of English 
administrative law as a contrast with French demagoguery is frequently rejected. See for example the 
critiques in note 22 infra. I do not intend to revisit the question here. 
11 Ibid at 54-56. 
12 Ibid at 60. 
13 Ibid at 183–4. 
14 Ibid at 184. 
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It is important to understand the explicit limits of Dicey’s discussion of the rule of law and 
legislative supremacy. Dicey focused on the principle that legislative activity is given space by 
the other branches of government. This space was protected in the sense that the executive and 
the judiciary did not have opportunities to interfere with or ignore legislat ion. Dicey’s discussion 
focused on the legislative process and not on administrative discretionary decision-making under 
otherwise valid legislation. For the most part, Dicey’s analysis highlighted that, in his 
understanding of the English tradition, bureaucrats and the executive did not have the ability to 
alter the legislative frameworks or judicial oversight that governs the civil liberties of citizens. A 
further element of the rule of law according to Dicey was that “no man is above the law” in the 
sense that all persons, regardless of rank, are subject to the ordinary laws of the country and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts.15 Dicey also identified “rule of law” as including 
general principles of the constitution which arise from common law jurisprudence.16 From this 
understanding of rule of law Dicey summarizes these elements: 
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and 
excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government.17 
 
Key to this understanding of the rule of law was the exclusion of “the idea of any exemption of 
officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the 
jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals”.18 It is said that Dicey’s conception of the rule of law “is 
                                                 
15 Ibid at 189. 
16 Ibid at 191. 
17 Ibid at 198. 
18 Ibid. 
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significant because by definition it excludes the possibility that administrative institutions might 
wield legal authority under the law of the constitution.”19 Dicey’s rule of law attempted to 
challenge the legitimacy of the administrative state. Dicey’s hope was that affirming legislative 
supremacy and rule of law would reinforce the accountability of bureaucrats and executive 
decision-makers to courts and legislatures. 
Legal historians have suggested, with some support in Dicey’s own writing, that Dicey’s 
perspective was grounded in a mistrust of growing administrative state institutions and their 
potential to limit economic liberty.20 However Mark Walters has pointed out that Dicey’s 
concerns about administrative law had deeper historical and constitutional roots, noting that 
Dicey’s concerns arose from a longer-term observation of common law scholars about the 
potential for executive discretion in continental legal systems to permit “suspensions of legality” 
in times of political tension, and to allow administrative tribuna ls to decide cases “from a 
governmental point of view” based on “official bias” rather than judicial independence.21  
Taken in this context, Dicey’s concern about bureaucratic and executive power was not unique 
and did not arise solely in the context of the growing administrative state. His concerns arose 
from a more universal institutional tension between legislative supremacy, judicial independence 
and executive power which remains relevant today.  
                                                 
19 Matthew Lewans, Administrative Law and Curial Deference (S.J.D., University of Toronto (Canada), 
2010) [unpublished] at 20. 
20 H W Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall LJ 
1 at 10–11. 
21 Mark D Walters, “Public Law and Ordinary Legal Method: Revisiting Dicey’s Approach to Droit 
Administratif” (2016) 66:1 UTLJ 53 at 57–67. 
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Dicey has been widely criticized on many grounds, including for his refusal to acknowledge that 
administrative and executive discretion had a legitimate place in the historical English legal 
tradition.22 For the purposes of this thesis, what is most relevant is that Dicey has been frequently 
critiqued for denying that administrators and the executive had a “legitimate” role in making and 
interpreting the law.23 Dicey has also been critiqued for claiming a judicial monopoly on 
statutory interpretation. This critique is often grounded in general claims about how the judiciary 
and administrative state function and about the purported strengths and weaknesses of different 
branches of government. For example, Hogg and Zwibel argued: 
Dicey exaggerated the virtues of the courts, exaggerated the risks of 
administrative decision making, misunderstood the state of 
administrative law even at the time when he wrote, and refused to see 
merit in the civilian systems of Europe.24 
 
Such critiques depend more on the political or philosophical position of the writer regarding the 
“virtues” of courts and the “risks” of administrative decision-making than on the utility of 
Dicey’s work for analysis of administrative law doctrines. Social and political perceptions of 
virtues and risks of various branches of government are not static or universal, they are dynamic 
                                                 
22 I do not intend to quibble with the arguments made by many able scholars that Dicey’s treatise was 
flawed on varied legal and historical grounds: See H W Arthurs, supra note 20 at 6–7; Martin Loughlin, 
“The Functionalist Style in Public Law Administrative Law Today: Culture, Ideas, Institutions, Processes, 
Values - Essays in Honour of John Willis - I. John Willis in Intellectual Context” (2005) 55 UTLJ 361 at 
366; Peter W Hogg & Cara F Zwibel, “The Rule of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada Administrative 
Law Today: Culture, Ideas, Institutions, Processes, Values” (2005) 55 UTLJ 715 at 716; Matthew 
Lewans, “Rethinking the Diceyan Dialectic” (2008) 58 UTLJ 75. Dicey is further critiqued on ideological 
grounds for coming from a conservative perspective that was opposed to the expansion of the 
administrative state, which he allegedly saw as imposing potentially arbitrary limits on economic liberty. 
For a more nuanced explanation of Dicey’s perspective see Walters, supra note 21. 
23 Lewans, supra note 19 at 20. 
24 Hogg & Zwibel, supra note 22. 
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and may shift over time. What such critiques tell us is that, over time, the potential risks posed 
by the rise of administrative discretion have come to be seen as irrelevant or at least less 
important in comparison to other social and political concerns. Moreover, the positivist 
understanding of law and legal reasoning upon which Dicey’s analysis depends has been 
critiqued. For example, a common critique of Dicey is that he overemphasized the clarity and 
simplicity of legislative will and the judicial role in, or legitimacy of, “objectively” identifying 
legislative intent.25 Notwithstanding these critiques, the concept of legislative intent and judicial 
efforts to discern that intent remains an important part of administrative law doctrine. 
Weber and the rise of administrative rationalism 
As the 20th Century continued and the administrative state grew, other scholars attempted to 
understand the internal logic of administration and how it impacted political power and civil 
rights. This line of scholarship in many ways reversed the logic of Dicey about the legitimacy of 
administrative statutory interpretation. These scholars argued that administrative reasoning could 
be superior to legal reasoning. They saw courts and legal reasoning as antiquated and formalistic, 
compared to a potentially dynamic and flexible administrative rationality based in expertise. 
In the early 20th Century German scholar Max Weber spent considerable time contemplating 
how policy discretion in the civil service impacted political power and civil rights.26 Weber and 
                                                 
25 Lewans, supra note 19 at 27; Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press 
1992) at 140; for other critiques and defenses of objective statutory interpretation see discussions in Cass 
Sunstein, “Interpreting statutes in the regulatory state” (1989) Harv L Rev 405; and Owen Fiss, 
“Objectivity and interpretation” (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 739.  
26 Fritz Sager, “Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy” (2009) 69:6 Public 
Administration Review 1136. 
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his predecessors, such as Friedrich Hegel, were concerned with how to achieve efficient and 
effective public administration. Hegel argued for a “formalized, rule-bound administrative 
system” that was objective and bound by precedent.27 For both Hegel and Weber, administrative 
effectiveness and legitimacy were grounded in an objective, independent, expert and heavily 
structured and professionalized civil service. Weber applauded the expert civil servant decision-
maker as dispassionate and rational, noting that only a professional and expert bureaucracy “has 
established the foundation for the administration of rational law…”. 28 Weber saw administrative 
discretion as non-arbitrary and arising from an idealized rationalism that “stands opposite the 
kind of adjudication that is primarily bound to sacred traditions” found in the judicial process. 
Weber rejects the Diceyan idea of objective court supervision of “gapless” laws.29 Yet Weber 
explicitly endorses rationalism and objectivity based in administrative expertise. In Weber’s 
view administrative expertise in rational law was superior to legal expertise. Notably he states 
that “in the field of executive administration, especially where the ‘creative’ arbitrariness of the 
official is most strongly built up, the specifically ‘objective’ idea of ‘reasons of state’ is upheld 
as the supreme and ultimate guiding star of the official’s behaviour” wherein “in principle a 
system of rationally debatable ‘reasons’ stands behind every act of bureaucratic 
administration…30 According to Weber, this system of providing rationally defensible reasons 
and the use of precedent by administrators ensures equality before the law.  
                                                 
27 Ibid. at 1142 
28 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy” in Heinrich Gerth et al, ed, Essays on Sociology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946) at 216. 
29 Ibid at 219. 
30 Ibid at 220. 
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Yet, at the same time, Weber recognized that there were risks to a strong bureaucracy that 
needed to be managed. He argued that: “bureaucracy as such is a precision instrument which can 
put itself at the disposal of quite varied — purely political as well as purely economic, or any 
other sort — of interests in domination.”31 Weber recognized that the expert knowledge of 
private economic interest groups could be superior to the expert knowledge of the bureaucracy, 
something which could potentially undermine the influence of the bureaucracy and cause it to be 
leveraged for narrow private purposes.32 Weber also understood that a strong bureaucratic 
structure raised the potential problem of overwhelming its political masters.33 Weber felt that for 
his ideal of a rational and therefore just bureaucracy to be realized, a strong legislature and an 
apolitical civil service were crucial.34 Weber identified the need for a working legislature with 
committees actively engaged in supervising and investigating the activities of bureaucratic 
departments. They would do so through “systematic cross-examination” of experts under oath in 
the presence of department officials. 
Weber’s ideas remain important because they provide the background understanding of the 
potential merits and risks of public administrative decision-making that form the backdrop for 
other scholarship on judicial review. While Weber advocated for the benefits of administrative 
expertise and rationality, he also understood that it required both internal and external checks and 
balances to ensure democratic control. 
                                                 
31 Ibid at 231. 
32 Ibid at 235. 
33 Ibid at 215–216. 
34 Ibid. 
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John Willis – recognizing the rational, expert civil servant in Canada 
As the administrative state grew in common law jurisdictions, common law scholars also 
adopted a more forgiving view of the administrative state compared to Dicey. Canadian scholar 
John Willis raised a number of practical concerns with judicial intervention in administrative 
statutory interpretation. He saw administrative discretion and the extent to which it should be 
controlled as “the fundamental problem of administrative law.”35 He made forceful arguments in 
favour of an expansive administrative state that was not subject to intense judicial oversight. He 
attacked the need for, and practicality of, impartial adjudication of legal rules that he saw as 
being the heart of the “rule of law.”36  
Willis was concerned that judicial intervention was a retrogressive force that prevented modern 
functions of the administrative state from being fully realized. In his view, the administrative 
state was inherently the instrument of collective public welfare. He characterized discretionary 
administrative powers as having a “purpose of fulfilment of a social philosophy that sets public 
welfare above private rights.”37 In contrast, the courts were seen as ideologically aligned with 
private rights and incapable of interpreting welfare statutes to advance social goals such as 
collective employee rights. For Willis, judicial method in statutory interpretation was defective. 
He asserted that, under the judicial method, “a statute is strictly construed. It is placed against the 
background of a common law whose assumptions are directly opposed to modern legislation.”38 
                                                 
35 John Willis, “The Administrator as Judge - The Citizens Right to an Impartial Tribunal” (1953) 2 UBC 
Legal Notes 427 at 431. 
36 Ibid at 427–428. 
37 John Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the 
Functional” (1935) 1:1 UTLJ 53, at 59. 
38 Ibid at 60. 
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Willis argued strongly against judicial intervention that he felt would undermine the growth of 
the administrative state more broadly.39 In essence, for Willis, the judiciary had an inherent bias 
towards private rights, which it applied in interpreting legislation that had socially or 
economically transformative objectives. At issue for Willis was whether those kinds of 
objectives could be met and who was better at ensuring this outcome as between courts and 
administrators.  
However, Willis’ favourable view of the administrative state went well beyond the specific 
context of the rise of the administrative state. Willis believed that the merits of administrative 
discretion in policy-making were universal, going so far as to suggest that executive discretion in 
the Tudor era could be similarly defended.40 Based on this view, Willis argued for a functional 
approach that asked what body was “best fitted” to exercise discretion and how that should be 
supervised.41 Yet Willis was clear on who was always going to be best fitted. In his view, judges 
“nullify the effect of statutes which emphasize not the rights of the subject but the claims of the 
state upon him.”42 Willis decried the absence of a more purposive approach by judges, saying 
they “are ignorant, by a self-imposed limitation, of the policy which the act sets forth in general 
statements…”43 In essence, what Willis sought was for Judges to leave the substantive “policy” 
                                                 
39 Ibid; John Willis, “Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies: A Study of 
the Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers Symposium on Administrative Law Based upon Legal 
Writings 1931-33” (1932) 18 Iowa L Rev 150; John Willis, “Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect” 
(1974) 24 UTLJ 225; John Willis, supra note 35; John Willis & Donald W Buchanan, Canadian boards 
at work  (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941). 
40 Willis, supra note 37 at 53-55. 
41 Ibid at 59. 
42 Ibid at 60. 
43 Ibid. 
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issues, including determining legislative intent, to administrators. His reasoning included a belief 
that judges tended to impose fundamental values on administrators that were detached from the 
realities of administration.44 
Willis developed important practical justifications for judicial deference to administrators, 
including on legal questions. Among the most important of these was necessity. Willis asserted 
that discretion, including discretionary regulatory powers, accorded to administrators were 
inherently required for the administrative state to function: “the delegation of legislative power 
to a government department… is now universally recognized by responsible persons as a 
practical necessity of the work of government is to be carried on at all.”45 Willis asserted that this 
institutional necessity was rooted in complexity and specialization in the modern administrative 
state, claiming “there are whole tracts of human life too specialized and complex for the Courts 
to deal with effectively”.46 He identified administrative discretion as a nexus of policy making, 
not simply legislative policy application. Willis questioned judicial legitimacy in this “policy 
making” role.47  
In Willis’ view, administrators had a superior understand ing of legislative intent and a superior 
method of statutory interpretation. Administrators, including in the executive, could further be 
trusted to be self-policing through such mechanisms as “professional pride” and guiding norms 
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and principles, and secondarily through the political process.48 Moreover, Willis argued that 
administrators were granted “discretion” not simply to flexibly apply fixed legal rules but also to 
make those rules. Speaking more specifically of tribunals, Willis felt that they often had very 
broad discretion over vague terms that could be best understood by the tribunals themselves.49 
Because of this view, Willis did not put much emphasis on legislative policy-making, the 
purposes for which discretion was granted by the legislature, or the concept of legal limits on 
administrative discretion. For Willis, there was no such thing since questions of law and policy 
were too difficult to differentiate in instances of broad discretion, which he perceived as being 
widespread.50  
Willis also brought a functional pragmatism and concern for access to justice to his scholarship. 
He argued that a burdensome court review process would undermine access to justice through 
tribunal decisions.51 However, Willis has been critiqued for neglecting the private interests and 
liberties of those who are subject to administrative decisions.52 Willis has also been critiqued for 
largely rejecting compatibility between rule of law and discretion.53 While Willis’ rejection of 
the rule of law may be at times hyperbolic,54 his approach of rejecting judicial policy making 
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through the interpretation of discretionary provisions would ultimately be influential in 
developing Canadian doctrine.55  
Historical context in Canada to the development of deference doctrine 
Willis’ perspective is certainly understandable if one looks at mid-20th century judicial 
interference in labour matters in Canada, where there is very compelling evidence of judicial 
hostility to legislation promoting collective bargaining.56 The modern approach to deference in 
Canadian administrative law accordingly arose in the context of labour adjudication.57 The rise 
of labour law emphasized the regulation of private economic affairs (i.e. employment contracts) 
by the state in favour of protecting employee interests. Prior to the development of deference 
doctrine, the Courts tended to intervene in favour of private rights and employer interests. There 
was heavy criticism towards judicial decisions that, it was argued, undermined the balance 
between employer rights and worker protections in labour laws across the country.58 In the post-
war period, Canadian legislatures included privative clauses in labour laws to try to limit judicial 
interference. Legislatures also moved labour adjudication to specialized boards and tribunals. 
Scholars argued that privative clauses gave democratic legitimacy to administrators on questions 
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of law that was sufficient to justify constraining judicial review.59 Matthew Lewans refers to the 
era, before that in which privative clauses were given weight, as the “formal and conceptual era” 
that emphasized separation of powers and the distinct roles of executive and judicial branches of 
government. Jurisprudence in this era was focused on identifying jurisdictional error. Lewans 
describes the era in disparaging terms: 
The upshot was an all-or-nothing approach to judicial review which 
jealously scrutinized the implementation of economic policy, but 
turned a blind eye towards executive decisions during wartime. While 
judges invoked the separation of powers, freedom of contract, and 
property rights to frustrate collective bargaining regimes, they were 
reluctant to deploy similar constraints to defend civil liberties or 
question draconian war measures.60 
 
Lewans also describes how the Privy Council struck down “nearly every piece of legislation” in 
the Canadian new deal era, relying largely on this methodology.61 Later, Justice Rand at the 
Supreme Court of Canada started to sketch out the early beginnings of a deferential 
reasonableness doctrine.62 However, this approach was not further developed for at least two 
decades after Justice Rand retired.63 Responding to these critiques, the Supreme Court ultimately 
developed deference doctrine to allow more space for specialized labour adjudicators to strike an 
acceptable balance between employer and worker rights in the interpretation of labour 
agreements and laws.64  
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CUPE – liberating the labour tribunals 
Justice Dickson’s seminal decision in CUPE in 1979 articulates some basic reasoning in favour 
of judicial restraint based on the development of the patent unreasonableness standard of review, 
while maintaining correctness as the standard for some ambiguously defined jurisdictional 
questions. In CUPE, Justice Dickson sets out important reasons why deference was warranted in 
the context of labour adjudication: the expertise of the Board in administering the legislation, the 
inclusion of a privative clause with a strong policy rationale, and the statute itself was 
ambiguous.65 There are clear echoes of Willis in these explanations. CUPE was authored by 
Justice Dickson but also appeared to be influenced by the academic work of Supreme Court 
Justice Bora Laskin, who had expertise in labour law and had commented extensively on 
deference and privative clauses in his academic career.66 Commenting on the need for judicial 
restraint and deference regarding the Board’s decision in CUPE Justice Dickson noted: 
The usual reasons for judicial restraint upon review of labour board 
decisions are only reinforced in a case such as the one at bar. Not only 
has the Legislature confided certain decisions to an administra t ive 
board, but to a separate and distinct Public Service Labour Relations 
Board. That Board is given broad powers—broader than those typically 
vested in a labour board—to supervise and administer the novel system 
of collective bargaining created by the Public Service Labour Relations 
Act. The Act calls for a delicate balance between the need to mainta in 
public services, and the need to maintain collective bargaining. Consid-
erable sensitivity and unique expertise on the part of Board members 
is all the more required if the twin purposes of the legislation are to be 
met.67  
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The decision is sparse in its explanation of what the “usual reasons” might be and whether they 
go beyond those addressed in the decision. CUPE should be read in the context of the political 
battle over labour relations in Canada and whether the judiciary should interfere with 
adjudicative regimes set up to protect post-war workers’ rights. CUPE gives a clear nod to 
Willis’s arguments that the administrative tribunal was afforded “broad powers” to balance 
various policy objectives and that the tribunal needed to use its “sensitivity and expertise” in 
relation to those policy objectives.  
After CUPE, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted what Lewans calls a “functionalist rationale” 
for deference. The Laskin court promoted an understanding that administrative tribunals and 
boards could be vested by legislatures with the authority to interpret laws in the first instance, 
and that they were owed deference by the courts. This was seen as acceptable so long as the 
judicial function was preserved through some degree of judicial review.68 In Pezim in 1994, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that statutory terms were best understood by administrators who had a 
role in policy development.69  
The common post-CUPE rationales for deference tried to align the practical justifications for 
deference that Willis highlighted with legal justifications such as legislative intent by way of 
privative clauses. The Supreme Court in the pragmatic and functional era presumed that the 
legislature intended the specialized administrative body (normally a tribunal or board) to 
interpret relevant statutory definitions largely as the administrative body sees fit, at least to the 
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extent that those provisions reside within the core of its expertise or are ambiguous.70 In this 
framing, the words of the statute are seen as intentionally or inherently ambiguous to permit the 
administrative decision-maker to use its discretion and flex its policy muscle to breathe meaning 
into the statutory language. At the same time, the practical justifications are anchored in the 
existence of a privative clause, confirming legislative intent to accord deference and therefore 
relying on a legislative rather than a purely judicial policy basis for giving effect to the practical 
justifications. 
Dyzenhaus – the middle ground 
More recently, scholarship and jurisprudence have tried explicitly to find a middle ground 
between Dicey and Willis. David Dyzenhaus, writing in the post-CUPE era, was highly critical 
of Willis’ rejection of the rule of law.71 Dyzenhaus’ writing was concerned, if indirectly, with the 
potential attack on the administrative state through pushes for privatization in government.72 
Dyzenhaus worried that privatization would remove “standard mechanisms of public law 
accountability” and the potential for privative clauses to “protect the process of privatization” 
from such mechanisms.73 As such, Dyzenhaus was concerned with the existence of “lega lly 
enforceable standards of accountability” in administration.74 Dyzenhaus recognized an important 
                                                 
70 David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in The Province of 
Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279 at 293–310. 
71 Dyzenhaus, supra note 48. 
72 Ibid at 693 where Dyzenhaus suggests that “Perhaps Willis would not have been so sanguine [that 
Canada was not a lassiez-faire state] had he lived through the recent conservative onslaught on 
government” also see Dyzenhaus, supra note 70 at 283 where Dyzenhaus claims that he was concerned 
that “the opponents of the administrative state are to be found within the apparatus of the state” due to 
privatization.  
73 Dyzenhaus, supra note 70 at 283.  
74 Ibid at 283. 
  
25 
question in administrative law: whether the legal limits of administrative power are set by the 
legislature, or whether there are also common law limits.75 Dyzenhaus argued that judges need 
not submit to the intention of the legislature (specifically in regard to privative clauses).76 
Dyzenhaus referred to submission to privative clauses as “a positivist understanding of 
intention.”77 Instead, Dyzenhaus advocated for common law values to have a role in 
administrative law. Dyzenhaus sources the legitimacy of judicial review to an “inherent limit” on 
what legislatures may delegate to the administrative state. Dyzenhaus saw judicial review as 
legitimate because it “maintains legal standards to which public officials are accountable” rather 
than being inherently hostile to public welfare, as Willis would have argued.78 Dyzenhaus 
acknowledged a fear that judge-made common law would erode the statutory aims of the 
legislature, but argued that judges have a role in upholding values like equality, which can be 
legitimated through a “legal culture of justification.”79  
With respect to administrative rationality, Dyzenhaus thought that judges should acknowledge 
that administration had its own rationality but be willing to supervise that rationality. However, 
the courts ought to supervise administrative rationality with caution to prevent themselves from 
engaging in a “Diceyan type judicial review.”80 Administrative rationality could be policed by 
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holding an administrator to “be true to the basic objective of its governing statute, on the judge’s 
understanding of that statute.” In other words, was the substantive policy content of the 
administrator’s decision rational? Of course, this approach risks judicial interference in policy 
areas that they do not understand, something that Dyzenhaus acknowledges.  
Dyzenhaus makes explicit a dilemma that is not explicit in the jurisprudence. Legislative 
supremacy suggests that it is for the legislature to determine what political and moral values will 
have the force of law. Where judges go beyond this position, whether by imposing common law 
values or by moderating the impact of privative clauses in their assessments of administrative 
rationality, Dyzenhaus argues that is a legal fiction that judges rely on legislative intent in doing 
so.81 However, Dyzenhaus was explicitly concerned that a privatized civil service would not 
source its power to legislative intent but rather to contracts with government, and that there could 
therefore potentially be “no legal limits on [administrative] power.”82 He further notes that this 
challenges courts to decide whether to defer to administrators simply because the legislature 
commands them to do so, through a privative clause, or, alternatively, to defer based solely on 
“substantive” or pragmatic rationales. Where these two factors are contradictory, how will courts 
determine which prevails? 
This ambiguity left Canadian courts in a dilemma. Should they defer 
merely because the legislature has said so despite the fact that the 
substantive rationale for deference is not in place? And should they 
defer when there is a substantive rationale for deference despite the fact 
that the legislature has not included a privative clause in the relevant 
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statute, perhaps even has expressly allowed for appeals on questions of 
law?83 
 
Dyzenhaus argued that much of the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence in the pragmatic 
and functional era was an attempt to reconcile the formal (or legislative intent) rationale for 
deference with the practical justifications for deference.84 
In Dyzenhaus’ understanding the judiciary is not set up in opposition to the administrative state, 
but instead as “partners” with the administrative state to preserve the rule of law.85 On this 
framing, administrative decision-makers are seen as full legal actors who can legitimately create 
subordinate legislation and interpret laws. Dyzenhaus argued that the judiciary should subscribe 
to a policy of “deference as respect” in which the interpretive approach and views of the 
administrative decision-maker are given weight, but some residual judicial oversight remains to 
preserve the rule of law. Judges should stop short of “submission” to administrative 
determinations on questions of law, as a privative clause might suggest was necessary, and 
should interfere where core common law or legislative values were at stake. Dyzenhaus was 
primarily concerned that submission to legislative intent on a “positivist” understanding (on a 
strict reading of Dicey) would perversely prevent judicial review by promoting a close adherence 
to privative clauses and that this could result in unrestrained administrative power. He strived for 
a consistent approach to the treatment of such clauses. 
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Mary Liston has observed that Dyzenhaus’ version of deference-as-respect was conditioned upon 
administrative justification and “reason-giving” as well as the principle of substantive equality.86 
For Dyzenhaus “the courts retain[ed] a legitimate role as the ultimate authority on the 
interpretation of the law.”87 However, the circumstances in which judges should interfere should 
not be formalistic, by which he meant that it should not be based on rigid categories of decision-
making. Instead, judges should rely on the underlying principles that justify any categories or 
distinctions.88  
The impact of Dunsmuir 
Dyzenhaus’ approach combined, on the one hand, respect for rule of law in the form of a more 
values-based approach to judicial review and, on the other hand, legislative intent to accord 
judicial deference through respectful attention to reasons of administrative decision-makers. 
Both elements of this approach were acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the pragmatic and 
functional era.89 Yet administrative law was also widely criticized in this era for creating 
“formalistic” debates and “law office metaphysics” around determining the proper standard  of 
review, as between correctness, reasonableness, and patent unreasonableness.90 Dunsmuir was an 
open attempt to simplify the pragmatic and functional approach by articulating a presumptive 
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standard of review of reasonableness and by eliminating the patent unreasonableness standard.91 
The majority in Dunsmuir, as explained by subsequent cases,92 confirms that reasonableness is a 
presumptive standard subject to rebuttal by four categorical correctness exceptions: (1) issues 
relating to the constitutional division of powers; (2) true questions of vires; (3) issues of 
competing jurisdiction between tribunals; and (4) questions that are of central importance to the 
legal system and outside the expertise of the decision-maker.93 
In Dunsmuir the Supreme Court confirmed that it would not submit to privative clauses because 
judicial review was constitutionally protected.94 In this way the Court confirmed that the 
constitutional nature of judicial review could trump express legislative intent. Dunsmuir also 
confirmed a commitment to implied legislative intent on the issue of the standard of review 
through the continued use of practical justifications and contextual factors. The contextual 
factors listed in Dunsmuir for determining standard of review are a mix of legal and pragmatic 
criteria for deference.95 For example, the majority in Dunsmuir notes that the existence of a 
privative clause is a strong indicator of legislative intent for deferential review but is not 
determinative.96 The majority in Dunsmuir asserts that judicial review affirms legislative 
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supremacy by narrowly construing the four categories of correctness review and also by 
“acknowledging that courts do not have a monopoly on deciding all questions of law.”97  
The majority in Dunsmuir also stated that the task of the courts is to preserve the rule of law 
while avoiding “undue” interference with administrative bodies.98 Rule of law is preserved by 
ensuring that the courts have the final say on questions of jurisdiction and some other questions 
of law.99 With a nod to Dyzenhaus, the majority reiterated that it intended to achieve rule of law 
based on broader values and legislative intent to accord deference.100 However, the majority in 
Dunsmuir articulated a strong presumption of reasonableness as the standard of review. The 
Court asserted that, where the question is one of fact, discretion or policy, deference on a 
reasonableness standard “will usually apply automatically.”101 
An often overlooked part of Dunsmuir and the caselaw that follows it is the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to a values-based purposive approach to statutory interpretation under 
reasonableness. The majority in Dunsmuir clearly utilizes Dyzenhaus’ framing that one can 
assess what makes a decision reasonable on a question of law from the administrator’s 
perspective, but also by drawing on broader statutory context and normative values. This 
approach suggests a stronger role for judicial statutory interpretation. For example, the Dunsmuir 
majority’s application of the reasonableness standard found that the decision was unreasonable 
because the adjudicator “relied on and led to a construction of the statute that fell outside the 
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range of admissible statutory interpretations.”102 Noting that “[t]he interpretation of the law is 
always contextual. The law does not operate in a vacuum,” the Court deeply questioned the 
adjudicator’s approach as inconsistent with the employment contract and “the larger labour 
context in which it is embedded.” In so reasoning, the Court held that “the decision does not fall 
within the range of acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and the 
law.”103 Yet, at the same time, the Court asserts that reasonableness entails the idea that “there 
might be multiple valid interpretations of a statutory provision or answers to a legal dispute and 
that courts ought not to interfere where the tribunal’s decision is rationally supported.”104 These 
two divergent comments leave it very unclear what the courts’ role is in statutory interpretation 
under a presumptive reasonableness standard. On the one hand, should a court second-guess the 
policy rationale behind the administrator’s interpretation by using the court’s own understanding 
of statutory purpose and context in light of broader normative values and, if so, to what extent? If 
there are multiple possible interpretations, how does the court know which ones are valid and 
which are not? How do administrators choose between multiple rational or valid interpretations? 
In essence, the Supreme Court’s post-Dunsmuir approach includes a strong commitment to 
judicial statutory interpretation, including a purposive and contextual interpretation leading to a 
positivist result. On the other hand, this approach extends, or may extend, only to a point, after 
which the administrator’s interpretation is owed deference and the Court’s commitment to a 
positive result dissipates. Yet it is unclear where the vanishing point of judicial oversight is or 
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how it can be determined. Likewise the principles that justify stopping short of full statutory 
interpretation – but nevertheless using it heavily in an outer layer of analysis, are not evident in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
Similarly, it appears contradictory to mix a strong presumption of reasonableness with the 
assertion that contextual factors (and precedents based on those factors) continue to play a role in 
determining whether the standard is reasonableness or correctness.105 The presumption of 
reasonableness is a move away from statutory interpretation on standard of review, while the use 
of contextual factors strongly imports a search for implied and express legislative intent on 
standard of review. 
The majority in Dunsmuir articulated a version of the rule of law that was focused primarily on 
preserving legislative intent to “create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad 
powers” and secondarily to ensuring that “all exercises of public authority must find their source 
in law.”106 The majority noted that “[b]y acting in the absence of legal authority, the decision-
maker transgresses the principle of rule of law.”107 It also emphasized that judicial review 
“performs an important constitutional function in maintaining legislative supremacy.”108 
However, the majority’s view of legislative supremacy is very limited. Legislative supremacy is 
“assured because determining the applicable standard of review is accomplished by establishing 
legislative intent.”109 Although the Court linked its presumptive standard (of reasonableness) to 
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legislative intent, the very presumptive nature of the reasonableness standard makes it more 
connected to “universal” practical justifications. These practical justifications and assumptions 
explained the presumption, not legislative intent based on a specific statutory framework.  
Moreover, the majority’s analysis assumed that there are workable distinctions between 
“questions of fact, policy or discretion” and the four categories of correctness review. The four 
categories of correctness review would then operate as a nuclear option, a rule of law backstop, 
while deference is afforded to administrators on questions of law the rest of the time.  
In this framework, the role of legislative intent and supremacy is limited to establishing the 
standard of review, and does not extend to the public policies that the legislature might have 
intended the administrator to advance. The latter type of intent does not inform the standard of 
review in any explicit manner under Dunsmuir. The great irony of Dunsmuir is that the Court 
does articulate broader public policy considerations and apply its own purposive statutory 
interpretation, but it does so mainly within a reasonableness analysis. This approach would 
continue in many cases after Dunsmuir, albeit largely unacknowledged. The rationale for this 
becomes clear, however, if one understands the reasonableness review in Dunsmuir as a nod to 
the values-based approach advocated by Dyzenhaus. 
A major failing of Dunsmuir is that the Court does not acknowledge the dilemma identified by 
Dyzenhaus: whether deference should be accorded primarily by relying on legislative intent or 
based on “free standing” practical justifications such as expertise. As will be seen in the post-
Dunsmuir jurisprudence discussed below, where legislative intent and practical justifications 
conflict, there is no consistent approach, although over time expertise has become the dominant 
factor. The Supreme Court has largely denied that it relies on free-standing pragmatic 
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justifications by styling them as part of “implied” legislative intent. Yet, in holding that express 
legislative intent in the form of privative clauses and rights of appeal are not determinative, the 
Court ensures that the exercise is not simply one of looking for legislative intent using ordinary 
statutory interpretation methods. Increasingly, the court presumes the existence of “implied” 
legislative intent factors such as expertise,110 which further disconnects the inquiry from 
legislative intent.  
Another limitation of Dunsmuir that would come back to haunt the Court is that the Court 
purports to be according deference on questions of law, but presumes that it has the expertise to 
do its own purposive statutory analysis. This seems to contradict the practical justifications for 
deference that Willis advocated, namely that judges don’t understand legislative intent on 
substantive questions of policy and are biased against public welfare legislation. Administrators 
on the other hand are experts in policy, and the legislature intended them to make policy. If 
judges do understand legislative intent, and should take the more substantive values-based 
approach that was advocated by Dyzenhaus, it begs the question of what role administrative 
expertise actually plays in explaining deference. If expertise remains an important practical 
justification for deference on questions of law, then what is that expertise? Is it expertise in 
purposive statutory interpretation or something else? If not the former, why is deference owed on 
questions of law? These questions remain largely unanswered. 
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Summary of various practical justifications for judicial deference 
These historical lines of argument represent differing philosophies about which branches of 
government should have power and how power should be mediated between them and for what 
purposes. They also express different views about the appropriate accountability mechanisms for 
administrators. The differences provide a backdrop for understanding the Canadian 
jurisprudence. Each highlights important risks arising from judicial intervention and 
administrative discretion. They are all worth considering when reflecting on deference and its 
jurisprudential justifications. 
The practical and legal justifications for deference are interrelated. The practical justifications, 
most clearly initially articulated by Willis, are premised on a belief that the legislature is 
institutionally incapable of managing the details of public affairs because they are too 
voluminous and complex in the modern state. On this reasoning, to manage public affairs, the 
legislature must delegate crucial functions to technical and policy experts within the public 
administration. Discretion is part and parcel of this process. Courts should not interfere lightly 
with the expert and policy functions of administrators because the functions are too complex for 
judges to understand and, moreover, the courts risk undermining the legislature’s necessary 
scheme of delegation. For example, Paul Daly argues that complexity makes some areas of 
decision-making better suited to administrators than to courts or the legislature.111 He argues that 
the expertise of administrative decision-makers – and their procedural flexibility and ability to 
resolve complex, uncertain and polycentric problems – positions them better than courts to 
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handle complexity.112 Legislatures, it is argued, cannot take on these public policy-making tasks 
because they would be too time consuming.113 Administrative discretion is explained as a 
necessary feature of complex regulation, and it warrants deference largely because it lies within 
the realm of expertise. Because of this complexity, necessity and expertise, administrators must 
have their own domain of power or sphere of influence.  
Weber and Willis were confident that administrative impropriety can be controlled by the 
legislature and the broader political process or, alternatively, by administrative professionalism. 
On the other hand, Dicey and Dyzenhaus were not convinced of the reliability of these means of 
control. Elements of both Willis and Dyzenhaus strongly animates the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. The core practical and legal justifications for deference based on the 
“necessity” argument are interrelated: (i) deference upholds legislative intent to delegate 
traditionally legislative functions, such as policy-making, to the administrative state;114 (ii) this 
delegation was seen as necessary to the functioning of the administrative state because of the 
complexity of the functions that the state must fulfill and (iii) non-“legal” expertise and a unique 
administrative rationality are desirable and necessary to manage that complexity.115 Judges are 
cast as out of their depth and unable to comprehend this complexity and, further, as being 
politically illegitimate when doing so, since this form of decision-making is a policy making role 
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and judicial interference is said to contradict legislative intent.116 However, where Willis 
advocates for an absence of judicial supervision and is skeptical that judges understand basic 
administrative policy, Dyzenhaus is more forgiving of judges and their ability to apply 
appropriate external values and norms to understand broader legislative policy and common law 
values. The tension between these perspectives remains very relevant. 
A general critique of the underlying practical justifications for deference  
The key assumptions behind the practical justifications 
Scholarship such as that of John Willis depended on assumptions about how administrators 
operate. First, it is assumed that there is relatively little internal or external interference with the 
broader goals of the administrative state at the level of the administrative decision-maker. 
Second, it is assumed that public decision-making is checked for arbitrary and improper behavior 
by internal bureaucratic, technocratic or expertise-driven checks and balances. Third, it is 
assumed that legislatures suffer from many significant limitations in terms of their capacity for 
public policy-making. 
In assessing the merits of deference, the universality (or not) of assumptions by scholars like 
Willis and Weber are important. If there is a material risk that these assumptions are not true, 
then accountability mechanisms for the administrative state – such as legislative reform, 
statutory interpretation and judicial review – take on more significance. As a background matter, 
it is important to remain open-minded about whether all of the assumptions about the complexity 
of modern public administration and the role of public service, in particular public service 
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experts, underpinning the necessity and complexity justifications for deference are empirically 
supported. This is particularly true where, to justify deference, the courts rely on an approach 
that sidelines legislative intent in favour of substantive and practical considerations.  
Failure to reflect on democratic accountability and control 
With respect to the third assumption, that legislatures have significant limitations on their ability 
to make and supervise public policy, it is worth asking how such a view might impact broader 
issues of political and democratic power. The standard justifications for deference are vulnerable 
to challenge to the extent that they largely do not grapple with fundamental questions of 
normative legitimacy and democratic oversight and control. Weber and Willis both assume that 
some level of political control over administrators was necessary and possible as an external 
check on administrators. In the standard justifications for deference, democratic legitimacy for 
the administrative state’s policy-making functions is sourced to legislative intent: Once the 
legislature intends to delegate discretion to an administrator, it is therefore legitimate, in the 
sense that the democratically elected legislature permitted the delegation.  
One feature of this type of reasoning however is that it fails to capture the spectrum or degrees of 
legislative delegation to administrators to make policy. Legislatures may make detailed public 
policy decisions, and grant very narrow discretion to implement those policies, or they may grant 
very broad policy discretion with few constraints on administrative decision-making. 
It is overly simplistic to assume that all delegations of administrative discretion are very broad 
such that legislative control over policy ends with a decision to delegate. The issue of democratic 
control takes on more importance when the legislature delegates powers to administrators for an 
express purpose or to serve a narrower policy implementation rather than a broad policy-making 
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function, or when the functions of a particular administrator are diverse. The reasoning of Willis 
is incomplete because it does not explain how administrators can be held accountable to the 
goals of these narrower functions or to the broader legislative objectives that motivated the 
legislature to grant the discretion.  
Delegation is further justified through the operation of law. This justification explains the 
legitimacy of the existence of the discretion, but it cannot explain the legal or normative 
legitimacy of the exercise of discretion in a particular case. The lack of an explanatio n for the 
legitimacy of the exercise of discretion may rest on implicit assumptions that: (i) administrators 
are not particularly likely to act contrary to their statutory mandates and (ii) that the legislature, 
as a general proposition, intends to grant administrators broad policy-making functions rather 
than narrowly administrative ones. Yet this framing fails to address how administrators can be 
held accountable, on an ongoing basis, in their use of discretion for the purposes for which it is 
granted. It likewise fails to show how they can be held accountable for adhering to the 
procedural or substantive limits to discretion which the legislature may have otherwise intended. 
In reasonableness review, accountability is largely directed towards an internal administrative 
rationality rather than outwardly towards the legality of a particular administrative decision. This 
rationality does not always have a clear relationship with legal frameworks that govern 
administrators. Without such a clear relationship, the legal legitimacy of a particular 
administrative decision is ambiguous. This framework also does not account adequately for the 
question of legislative control and accountability through law-making and the provision of policy 
direction to administrators.  
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In the absence of a clear role for judicial statutory interpretation within reasonableness, there is 
no clear mechanism for such legislative control to be maintained. The pragmatic justifications for 
deference rely on a theory that legislatures must, of necessity, delegate some policy-making 
functions and rely on experts. Yet the tensions between bureaucratic expertise and the 
availability of democratic oversight are not always acknowledged. Some scholars have 
recognized that the pragmatic justifications for the power of the administrative state are not fully 
compatible with constitutional principles of democratic control.117 Others have noted that the 
emphasis on expertise has antidemocratic overtones: 
When power can be properly exercised only by experts, because they 
demonstrate their ability to exert control over people or machines, then 
the claim of the old participants in politics, citizens and politicians, to 
have a part in controlling such power is rejected. In fact, both the 
citizen and the politician are disqualified from the new apolitics. They 
are replaced by functionaries and experts.”118 
 
Weber acknowledged this tension and was concerned that an expert bureaucracy could 
overwhelm democratic institutions. In arguing for a strong bureaucracy, Weber argued for strong 
legislative oversight based on searching legislative committees as well as internal peer review.119 
Weber felt that for his ideal of a rational and just bureaucracy to be realized, a strong legislature 
and an apolitical civil service were crucial.120  
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The modern theory of deference in Canada contrasts with Weber’s approach in that, in the 
modern theory, bureaucratic independence, internal bureaucratic accountability structures and 
substantive legislative oversight are often overlooked entirely. Canadian administrative law 
scholars tend simply to assume that the legislative role in policy-making is limited and that it is 
not realistic to expect legislatures to decide complex policy issues. For example, in her academic 
work, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin highlights the necessity 
justification, if in more muted tones than Willis, asserting that the courts must partner with 
administrative institutions rather than dominate them “as a purely practical matter.” McLachlin 
also claims that “modern governmental administration is so pervasive and complex that it can be 
achieved only through administrative boards and tribunals.”121 Implicit in this position is a view 
that “modern” policy-making cannot be done by legislatures. Scholar and prominent 
administrative law jurist John Evans has also commented that:  
[T]he goals of ensuring effectiveness, fairness and democratic 
legitimacy cannot be met in the contemporary administrative state 
through a combination of judicialized public administra tion and the 
traditional political process.122 
 
Evans is explicit in his dismissal of the “traditional political process” as a vehicle for policy 
making, going so far as to imply that this would not have democratic legitimacy. The wholesale 
rejection by legal scholars of “traditional political process” (in other words, legislators acting 
directly on matters of policy) as an effective means of governing seems cynical. More 
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concerning is the absence of clarity about what democratic accountability mechanisms could or 
should replace legislative oversight. Very few legal scholars ask or answer questions about 
accountability of the administrative state and how existing democratic and bureaucratic 
institutions do or do not provide effective oversight.  
When Canadian scholars do turn their minds to issues of legislative accountability and control, 
they tend to side-step them as having little importance in relation to judicial oversight of 
administrative discretion. For example, Daly argues that “in certain instances” the executive or 
legislative branch may have authority over administrators.123 However, his examples of 
legislative authority are limited to appearances before legislative committees, public reporting 
and budgeting.124 Daly does not discuss whether these mechanisms are effective at ensuring that 
administrators are acting within the boundaries that the legislature intended to set for them. 
Indeed, these examples are not really accountability mechanisms in any direct sense. Appearance 
before a legislative committee may give the legislature information that could assist with 
reforming the law but not necessarily with ensuring administrative compliance with an existing 
law. Similarly, public reporting provides information relevant to administrative accountability 
but not the ability for the legislature to change administrative behaviour directly by changing the 
law. Finally, budgeting can restrict or enhance the prestige and power of administrators, but it is 
not clear that reducing, or threatening to reduce, the budget of an administrator causes the 
administrator to pursue legitimate legislative objectives in a better way. It might be equally 
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plausible that budgetary considerations might undermine statutory objectives by incentivizing 
administrators to “re-calibrate” those objectives to align with available resources. Daly 
acknowledges that the inclusion in a statute of democratic checks and balances, such as public 
reporting, could be relevant to whether there was legislative intent to accord deference.125 Yet 
Daly ultimately concludes that the very concept of democratic legitimacy is “vague” and 
therefore lacks relevance to doctrines of judicial deference.126  
Dyzenhaus recognized that deregulation and privatization could undermine the democratic 
accountability of administrators. He argued that the “opponents of the administrative state are to 
be found within the apparatus of the state…” and that governments may desire judicial deference 
“to protect the process of privatization from the reach of standards developed during the heyday 
of the [welfare] state.”127 In other words, administrative discretion may be a vehicle to obscure 
policy change away from the promotion of the administrative state and could serve to undermine 
legislative accountability. Scholars too often ignore this transparency problem in public policy 
and its relationship to democratic oversight and control. As Lorne Sossin has noted, a heavy 
emphasis on functionalism or pragmatism may come at the expense of ensuring that 
administrative practices are aligned with legal norms and social objectives of the legislature, by 
legitimating “whatever administrative practice is deemed functionally necessary to perpetuate the 
status quo.”128 
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Beyond noting that some policies set by the legislature might be attacked or undermined by the 
executive and the administrative state itself, scholars also do not question the principled reasons 
why the legislature should be able to delegate policy-making functions to the executive or to 
administrators from the perspective of democratic accountability. Martin Loughlin has gone so 
far as to claim that “majority rule is no longer the fundamental principle of modern 
democracy.”129 Therefore, there is an implicit philosophical stance inherent in the practical 
justification for deference. It is that the complexity of state functions and the expertise of 
administrators in managing that complexity provides a normative legitimacy for a process that 
takes public policy making power away from legislatures and increases the power of 
administrators to effect social change. This stance rests on implicit assumptions that legislatures 
are ineffectual at making public policy. Further, it rests on a view that public administrators are 
legitimate, expert, trustworthy, independent and capable implementers or promoters and 
designers of public policy.130 Sossin notes that “[a]ccording such esteem to the critical judgments 
of administrators does not mesh well with either our conception of democratic governance or the 
rule of law.”131 
My analysis starts from the premise that there must be, at a minimum, some level of 
accountability for day to day administrative decision-making to legislative objectives if the 
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administrative state is to have normative legitimacy in a democracy. Legitimacy for all uses of 
discretion cannot accrue from the delegation of some measure of discretion by the legislature in a 
statute. The legislature must be able to shape the uses for which administrative discretion can be 
put. A democratically elected legislature must be able to reform the law governing administrative 
discretion to ensure its desired substantive policy outcomes are achieved. In other words, one 
should reject the notion that the legislature has no role in making public policy, or that it is 
necessary to devolve the vast majority of policy-making functions to the administrative state. A 
theory of deference must address, at least to some extent, how legislative intent on substantive 
questions of policy can be advanced through legal rules and identify plausible accountability 
mechanisms for those rules. It is not sufficient to suggest that questions of democratic 
accountability and control over public policy are quaint because the experts will handle 
everything. This approach fails to respond to Dicey’s fundamental concern, which is how to 
ensure that administrative decision-making is not merely a vehicle for enhanced executive power 
relative to legislatures. To address this concern, it is not sufficient to presume that administrators 
act in an idealized fashion. 
Dicey’s concerns about administrative discretion and its potential to enhance executive power 
remain very relevant. Political scientists and scholars on public administration in Canada have 
raised concerns about concentration of power in the executive and the loss of power by elected 
representatives and lower-level bureaucrats. Focusing on the federal government, Donald Savoie 
has documented the concentration of power in what he calls “central agencies” such as the 
Treasury Board and the Prime Minister’s Office. He argues that the legislature, the Cabinet and 
the civil service have progressively lost influence over the machinery of government. He 
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describes the role of the public service as being “to take political direction, and where it doesn’t 
exist, to tread water until direction is given. In short, the role of administrators is to advise the 
rulers on complex policy issues, not to make the decisions.”132 Others have followed up on this 
line of scholarship, calling this governance from the centre the “new political governance”.133 It 
has been argued that the pressures of “new political governance” serve to weaken the traditional 
norms of political neutrality, professionalism and relative independence of administrators and 
that it constitutes a “corrupt form of politicization.”134 This scholarship is important because it 
raises fundamental questions about whether the executive or central agencies are making policy 
decisions and judgments or whether the “expert” administrators are.  
In this context, questions of law may become the purview of central agencies or, optimistically, 
the senior legal advisors to government, acting on political calculus rather than expertise in either 
technical issues or policy. If the executive and central agencies are in charge, then it is an open 
question whether the “expert” administrators are playing the function of managing the 
complexity of the administrative state.135 If political masters or central agencies are really the 
drivers behind administrative decisions, this could fundamentally undermine each of the 
necessity, complexity and expertise pragmatic rationales for deference. If central agencies can 
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manage the subject matter of decisions, then they may also be simple enough for legislatures and 
legislative committees to set clear policies about them. Further, central agencies and high-level 
political decision-makers are usually generalists and not experts in the details of policies or 
statutory interpretation. It is therefore unclear if any epistemic advantage exists over the 
legislature or the courts. Complexity explains why a legislature would want to delegate policy 
functions to an administrative decision-maker, and the related argument of necessity explains 
why they should be able to. Yet both the complexity and necessity justifications for deference are 
vulnerable where politics, not expertise, strongly influences decision-making. There may be 
instances where political or bureaucratic institutional influences prevail. The presence of these 
factors may rebut the assumption that the policy function is “too complex” for legislatures to 
engage in directly.  
I do not suggest that political interference should be a contextual factor for review by a court. 
Such an inquiry would often be fruitless in judicial review. Rather, the critique is that 
assumptions about these characteristics of administration are used to justify deference. I leave 
open the possibility that there may be some instances where there are sufficient legislative 
indicia of both independence and expertise to provide confidence that practical justifications for 
deference are sustainable. Nevertheless, a widespread centralization of administrative functions 
leads to questions about the merits of relying on the necessity and complexity justifications as 
opposed to other criteria for deference to administrators. The scholarship from Canadian political 
scientists who study public administration should give cause for concern about relying on these 
justifications as “substantive” reasons for deference. Ultimately, any presumptions about 
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complexity, necessity and expertise should be treated with at least some caution. Taken alone, 
they cannot support judicial deference as a general policy for all administrators in all cases.  
Legitimacy and presumptive limits of delegated public policy making 
Complexity is advanced as a rationale for why there is a policy-making function delegated to 
administrators.136 Legislative intent may provide the basis for determining that a decision-maker 
has, in law, been granted the discretion over questions of public policy. Yet it does not explain 
why that discretion should be constitutionally permissible or why it is in line with the separation 
of powers or democratic principles. In other words, why do we consider it to be normatively and 
constitutionally legitimate for administrators who may not be democratically accountable in a 
meaningful sense to make public policy? Fisher has argued that while public administration is “a 
well-entrenched and necessary feature of democratic life”, any clear democratic or constitutional 
theory about its legitimacy is elusive and has “defied principled explanation”.137  
Canadian scholars and jurists tend to accept that the delegation of public policy making by the 
legislature can be unlimited. Such delegation – whether to administrators or the executive itself –
can only be accounted for at the ballot box or through non-confidence votes. A strong separation 
of powers in Canada has long been dismissed by constitutional law scholars such as Hogg,138 
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although it has occasionally been acknowledged as a constitutional principle by the Supreme 
Court in limited contexts.139  
In modern administrative law in Canada, as compared to the United States, the extent of 
legislative power to delegate policy or law-making roles to administrators has rarely been given 
serious treatment.140 This lack of serious debate does not, however, make the problem disappear. 
In the abstract, the legislature can always be held accountable for such delegation or withdraw 
such expansive administrative or executive powers. This possibility does not eliminate the 
normative problem of delegation, which raises the question of the legitimacy of those doing the 
governing and making the substantive decisions that impact people’s lives. Further, delegation 
can discourage legislative consensus and transparency of process in favour of more clandestine 
or narrowly focused policy-making.141  
The implications for democracy of an expansive view of delegation are significant. For example, 
in theory, it means that it is possible for a majority government to pass a single law that grants 
the prime minister or Cabinet total discretion over all matters of public policy. Others have 
pointed to the potential availability of Henry VIII clauses that grant the executive authority to 
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dispense with legislative requirements.142 I do not attempt to argue for the use of a version of the 
American non-delegation doctrine in Canada; that doctrine presents serious challenges that are 
beyond the scope of this paper.143 However, the absence of such a doctrine highlights the 
importance of other administrative law principles which potentially define the legitimate uses of 
administrative discretion. 
Canadian courts have tackled this issue by highlighting purposive legislative objectives and 
broader normative context as a tool for legislative and judicial regulation of administrative 
discretion. For example, in Roncarelli v Duplessis Justice Rand attempted to establish that 
discretion, under a public law regulatory statute, could only be exercised for the purposes for 
which it was granted. Thus, Justice Rand asserted something like the non-delegation doctrine 
when he said “in public regulation… there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled 
“discretion”.144 Supporting this position, he held that there was effectively a statutory 
interpretation presumption against such discretion and that only “express language” could enable 
“arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose.”145 Justice Rand asserts that there is “always” a 
perspective within which a statute is intended to operate.146 In light of this limitation on 
discretion, the exercise of statutory interpretation – to define the purposes for which the 
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legislature granted discretion, and accordingly what purposes are “irrelevant” or outside the 
jurisdiction of the administrator – are important. The doctrine set out in Roncarelli creates an 
interpretive presumption, not an independent basis, for striking out otherwise valid legislation 
granting administrative discretion. It leaves open the possibility of “express language” granting 
untrammelled discretion. Roncarelli nevertheless attempts to hold legislatures accountable for 
the extent of their delegation of policy-making functions and reinforces the judicial function in 
policing those boundaries. 
Such purposive approaches to defining legitimate administrative action have important 
intersections with the practical justifications for deference. If one gives weight to Willis’s view 
that administrators understand the purposes of legislation better than courts, then the judicial role 
in enforcing purposive limits to administrative power is questionable. A judicial role in policing 
legislative purpose introduces the risk of judges making mistakes about the purposes for which 
discretion is granted, because those purposes are complex, they follow an administrative not a 
legal logic and administrators are potentially better able to understand them.  
On this reasoning, where courts disagree about the legislative purpose, they should let the 
administrator’s understanding prevail because the administrator has the policy expertise to give 
better effect to legislative intent on substantive questions of policy.147 This step creates the 
significant problem that, if legislative purpose is itself part of the arena of administrative 
discretion, then there can be no judicial presumption that there are any related limits to 
discretion, as described in Roncarelli. Of course, expertise in legislative purpose is not the only 
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type of expertise that administrators might have as a basis for deference, but it is central to 
deference on statutory interpretation. 
As Willis observed, there will often be no clear boundary between a question of law and a 
question of policy in an administrative context. Even very constrained discretion has some 
potential for public policy-making.148 This policy making function can be broad and explicit; for 
example, discretion to determine if something is in “the public interest” by weighing various 
factors. Or, it can be far more subtle, such as applying a narrow legislative definition to 
particular facts. Galligan has argued that there is essentially endless variation in the degree to 
which official discretion may be constrained, including by rules or by standards and values, and 
that there is no “discretion free” decision-making.149 Similarly Davis has explored the 
characteristics of broader policy discretion and has acknowledged that legislatures cannot 
anticipate all policy issues or eliminate all discretion.150 Gifford has explored how attitudes 
towards discretion are shaped, by focusing on decision-making that is non-repetitive and heavily 
factual in nature and that must therefore be guided by principles and values rather than narrow 
rules.151 Pratt and Sossin have summarized the literature on discretion – following Dworkin’s 
discretionary hole in the legal doughnut metaphor – as espousing a view that there is a binary 
relationship between law/ rules and discretion and that “[t]his view also reflects the conceit that 
                                                 
148 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary justice: a preliminary inquiry. -- (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1969) at 41–42. 
149 Denis James Galligan, Discretionary powers: a legal study of official discretion  (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986) at 34–35. 
150 Davis, supra note 148 at 41–42. 
151 Daniel J Gifford, “Discretionary Decision-making in the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual 
Framework” (1983) 57 S Cal L Rev 101. 
  
53 
discretion can be eliminated and that legal rules, when not framed in discretionary terms, are 
somehow self-executing.”152 
Thus it is flawed simply to try and parse out decisions that are broadly discretionary and imbued 
with “policy” or “polycentricity”, for more deference, from those that are narrower. Both equally 
raise the problem of what branch of government should make policy as between the legislature, 
the executive and the courts and therefore the problem of what presumption applies in relation to 
standard of review.153 To the extent that legislatures direct policy, can courts police the 
boundaries of that policy through legal reasoning on the assumption that it was the legislature’s 
intent? Or, should we assume, as Willis does, that the fact that a decision is being implemented 
by an administrator means that the legislature delegated all policy functions to the administrator, 
including ascertaining legislative purpose?  
Willis’ approach is arguably incompatible with the existence of clear legal rules or legislative 
policy-making through those rules. Instead, legislation presumptively grants policy discretion to 
administrators, rather than asking administrators to carry out predetermined policies. Justice 
Rand in Roncarelli and Dyzenhaus provide another option, where legislation may create a space 
within which administrative discretion prevails, but it is still circumscribed by broader normative 
and legislative principles which are the purview of courts.  
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If the legislature cannot eliminate discretion, this has important implications because it means 
that the legislature is not unlimited in its ability to impose legal rules that are enforceable by the 
courts. There are areas of regulation where the legislature has little practical choice but to 
delegate some form of discretion, including policy-making discretion, to administrative decision-
makers. Yet we lack a theory explaining whether the fact of delegation of administrative 
discretion necessarily implies, in turn, a legislative intent that courts should refrain from 
interpreting the legal rules that bound that discretion, or to what extent. The fact that such 
decisions may be guided by legislated objectives or values, rather than bounded by hard legal 
rules, does not in itself mean that the legislature wanted administrators to have the final say 
about how those “soft” objectives and values should be implemented. 
The transparency of a public policy-making function, when undertaken by administrators, can 
vary widely. This lack of transparency can be significant. There are many areas of regulation 
where the difference between mediating polycentric interests and making public policy, on the 
one hand, and executing technical expertise, on the other, are blurred. For example, risk 
assessment entails well-known difficulties related to separating value judgments about risk from 
“objective” scientific or mathematical assessments.154 Risk assessment and risk management are 
widely acknowledged to be value-laden and subjective in nature, rather than “pure” science that 
can rely on internal scientific checks and balances while incorporating subjective structures and 
assumptions based on judgment.155 Risk regulation has a policy-making element that is 
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conducted largely outside the democratic process and that therefore raises questions about the 
legitimacy and transparency of public policy-making.156 Moreover, the way risks are framed and 
the desired endpoint of the risk (such as lives saved, injuries avoided, or environmental benefits) 
may also be value-laden and subjective.157 The relationship between professional bureaucratic 
risk management and discretion is also iterative in that the structure and opacity of risk 
assessment can hide or obscure the “black box” of discretion.158 As Sossin has also noted, the 
tendency of civil servants, even outside this type of regulation, is to disguise subjective policy 
determinations behind apparently rational and neutral decisions.159 This practice presents 
important transparency and democratic legitimacy problems for deference. It becomes unclear 
how the public would even know about the policy decisions being made by administrators and, 
accordingly, how there could be any political accountability for such decisions. 
The existence of these problems strongly supports the legitimacy of judicial accountability 
mechanisms such as the one employed in Roncarelli, where judges can try to ascertain legislative 
intent on the overall policy objectives of statutes and hold administrators accountable for using 
and interpreting their powers in accordance with those objectives. While this approach presents 
the very serious risk that judges will misinterpret or misconstrue the objectives of administrative 
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statutes, the risk is also present where administrators are involved in statutory interpretation and 
policy implementation. Certainly, judges have the advantage of institutional independence in 
determining legislative intent, even where they have other practical disadvantages such as lack of 
policy expertise.  
The limits of expertise 
Daly has recognized that, even where experts have expertise on questions of law, expertise has 
limitations. He highlights various phenomena such as agency capture and groupthink that can 
undermine expert effectiveness.160 He notes that “[c]ourts should remain alive to the possible 
shortcomings of expertise”.161 However Daly does not propose any doctrinal mechanism by 
which to ensure that expertise is being used in a way that makes administrative determinations 
on questions of law superior to those of courts. Instead, Daly advocates for expertise to be 
grounded in legislative intent and asserts that only implied legislative intent about expertise can 
justify its use to explain deference. Yet this position seems to do little to address the risks of 
problems like agency capture. It raises the question of how administrative expertise can be 
policed and by whom. Willis and Weber advocated for professionalism and peer review 
mechanisms to ensure the rational use of expertise, using the administrator’s own specialized and 
unique understanding and logic. However this method offers no external political, public or 
democratic accountability, and presumes a particular administrative structure that is based on 
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independent but internal peer review. Canadian administrative law does not currently take into 
account whether such internal accountability mechanisms are in place.  
At the outer boundary, current administrative law doctrines suggest that courts can get at this 
issue by looking to the internal rationality of the administrator, as expressed through transparent 
and intelligible reasons. For example the majority in Dunsmuir asserts that “courts ought not to 
interfere where the tribunal’s decision is rationally supported” and speaks of a range of 
“acceptable and rational” solutions that an administrator might reach.162 This fails to address the 
possibility that a decision could be superficially rational without employing any expertise in the 
policy behind a statutory provision or its meaning. At its most extreme, a decision may appear 
superficially rational or well-reasoned even where it runs contrary to the objectives of a statute or 
the technical or expert norms or methods in a particular area. Specialized norms or functions may 
also appear irrational to an outside observer. The test of rationality in reasonableness review is 
therefore a poor test of, or proxy for, expertise in the interpretation of law. Accordingly, more 
than bare “rationality” is required for a decision to be reasonable, there must be a substantive 
component to reasonableness and deferential review. Such a substantive component may serve 
ensure administrative accountability to the practical justifications that underpin deferential 
review, such as expertise, or accountability to legislative intent.  
Even setting aside the need for a substantive component to judicial review, it is worth 
questioning the weight given to rationality in assessing the reasonableness of administrative 
decisions. Weber’s view of public administration as fundamentally rational has been questioned 
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by more recent scholars, such as Herbert Simon. Simon questions whether bureaucrats operate as 
purely rational actors employing technical expertise. He relies on the phenomenon of “bounded 
rationality” to explain administrative decision-making, particularly in complex situations. Simon 
argues that so-called “rational” administrative decision-making “takes place within the 
boundaries of the limited capability of human beings to be entirely value free and objective”163: 
Rather than seeking out information to optimize their decisions across 
various alternatives, decision makers “satisfice” and make “good 
enough” decisions by using rules of thumb and other heuristics that 
reduce the need to collect and process information. In such models, 
decision making entails “muddling through,” with scientific 
information being only one element of “a broad, diffuse, open-ended, 
mistake-making social or interactive process, both cognitive and 
political.”164 
 
Simon explains that “actual computation of the optimum [solution to a problem through 
substantively rational analysis] is infeasible for problems of any size and complexity.” 
Accordingly, for complex problems one needs “a theory of efficient computational procedures to 
find good solutions” and a shift from optimal solutions to “good solutions”.165 Further, a shift 
from substantive to procedural rationality is necessitated when administrators are faced with any 
significant uncertainty.166 Simon’s analysis questions strongly whether administrators are self-
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correcting and emphasizes that the process of administrative decision-making can overtake 
substantive results. This perspective raises important questions about whether internal 
bureaucratic mechanisms will actually reinforce or undermine rational decision-making. The 
solution that is “good enough” may have a strong political dimension that is potentially devoid of 
both a policy rationale in relation to the statute and a rational interpretation of the statute. The 
implications of Simon’s critique are twofold: first, courts cannot necessarily expect 
administrative decisions to be rational, even on an administrator’s own terms; second, it may in 
practice be difficult to determine whether a decision is “rational” in real life by taking the 
decision on its own merits. Ultimately it is clear that administration cannot be completely self-
policing in terms of enforcing internal norms, expertise or rationality. 
Administrative “rationality” must inevitably be measured against some external standard or 
value, such as legislative objectives and broader norms, like Dyzenhaus proposed. The language 
in Dunsmuir implies as much by referring to “acceptable and rational” solutions along a 
continuum. To a limited extent, this position guards against decisions which are coldly rational 
but which advance improper interests outside the object and purpose of legislation.167 Yet this 
approach requires a strong role for judicial statutory interpretation and recognition that courts 
have a role in policing statutory language and purposes as applied by administrators.  
Deliberative democracy and procedural legitimacy 
The modern approach to addressing problems of regulatory opacity, the limits of expertise and a 
lack of perceived democratic legitimacy for administrators tend towards public consultation and 
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other deliberative democratic mechanisms. Daly refers to this tendency as “procedural 
legitimacy” and has argued that it is itself a practical justification for deference.168 However, 
deliberative democratic processes have been critiqued as largely idealized and theoretical rather 
than addressing the real-life power dynamics that are engaged when members of the public or 
disparate interest groups participate in regulatory processes.169 Proponents of deliberative 
democratic rationality take the view that “outcomes produced by good procedures are by 
definition good outcomes.”170 Many scholars have pointed out that this position merely replaces 
substantive administrative rationality with procedural administrative rationality, in the sense that 
the “decision is procedurally rational if it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation.”171 This is 
sometimes understood as “communicative rationality”.172 Deliberation procedures may substitute 
for the lack of information or uncertainty involved.173 The reasoning behind rational, technical 
documentation of administrative decisions is itself a potential means of bureaucratic managerial 
control as explained by Rydin: 
The step-by step methodologies become a means of maintaining 
control through managerial modes. Issues of expertise are handled 
through bringing in outside advice, particularly from scientists, but 
outside expertise never undermines the advice that the controllers of 
the policy process themselves give. Rather they become part of a 
cascade of advice: manuals advise bureaucrats; they take advice from 
other experts; and they in turn advise politicians. This cascade also 
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erects a wall between political decisions and advice or expertise. It 
helps present the policy official in a neutral role. … In this way, the 
problems of the rational comprehensive model that have been 
identified by commentators – such as the impossibility of 
comprehensive data collection, the tendency towards satisficing rather 
than optimizing, and the problem of incommensurate preference 
orderings – are swept aside. … Similarly the messy interaction of 
interests within policy is ignored; methodology overcomes power.174 
 
Any type of administrative decision that blends technical expertise with the application of policy 
judgement will have these same challenges. It will be at risk of disguising discretion on broad 
public policy issues as technical expertise and legitimating those decisions through public 
participation. In this way, administration can substitute, if poorly, for democratic debate and 
democratic decision-making. Ulrich Beck’s theory of the “risk society” is important to 
understanding that public risk regulation is potentially subversive in that managing risks can 
threaten “the legitimacy of the political-economic system” based on expansive industrial 
capitalism.175 Beck argues that democratic or participatory ways of managing risks also serve to 
legitimate the continuing persistence of those risks.176 Thus certain types of policy outcomes may 
tend to be favoured by deference towards administrators. The type of outcomes that might be 
favoured could include those that perpetuate industrial capitalism or which uphold the status quo 
socio-economic power structure. Those policy outcomes may not necessarily be aligned with the 
policy outcomes desired by the legislature. 
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Thus it would be dangerous, doctrinally, to assume that all or most administrative decisions are 
grounded in expertise merely because a decision appears to be substantively or procedurally 
rational and is stated in formally rational and neutral terms. This recognition raises the 
significant problem of the proper role of deference where technical or even policy expertise is 
not the only decision-making basis. It raises the further problem of how deference is impacted, if 
at all, when the decision-maker does not take the advice of his or her experts or disregards the 
stakeholders whose participation is relied on for procedural rationality. For example, in 
environmental regulation, particularly environmental assessment, decisions have been frequently 
critiqued as being based on science that relies heavily on questionable methods, and analysis that 
is not transparent.177 It is difficult to explain deference to this type of decision-making by heavily 
relying on justifications such as expertise or by relying on process. 
Therefore, the rationality of administrative decisions, whether procedural or substantive, can in 
some circumstances be little more than a way of neutrally justifying policy decisions that are not 
politically neutral.178 While rationality may serve to legitimize administrative decisions and 
procedures, this impact does not mean that these decisions in-fact achieve or help achieve the 
substantive legislative goals that motivated the delegation of discretion. It can be challenging to 
decipher whether an apparently rational administrative decision has substantive merit. 
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Nevertheless, ignoring the substantive merit of complex administrative decisions in relation to 
statutory goals risks permitting a presumption of “untrammelled discretion.”  
All of these issues raise the question of whether courts can or should police administrative 
rationality and to what extent. If we accept that this rationality is not as simple as Weber’s 
idealized administrative actors, using technical expertise and regulated by clear internal rules and 
logic, then the rational principles underpinning complex administrative decisions become more 
and more unclear. At a minimum, there is a potentially important judicial role in policing the 
transparency of such decisions, particularly where they purport to be the outcome of procedurally 
rational processes. Moreover, such decisions are best understood in relation to legislative 
objectives as expressed through statutory language.  
It may be raised that the Courts provide a weak venue for policing either administrative 
rationality or expertise. This is a legitimate concern. However this critique assumes that Courts 
should focus on these aspects of administrative decision-making instead of more substantive or 
legal concerns around legislative intent and transparency. Where the focus of judicial review is 
on the latter aspects of administrative decision-making, it provides a democratically legitimate 
basis for substantive review. First, in the form of ascertaining legislative intent on substantive 
policy goals using legal reasoning, and second by ensuring that administrative decisions 
transparently uphold the practical justifications for administrative delegation by providing 
transparent, reasoned decisions that are compatible with legislative intent.  
Failure to reflect on the importance of impartiality and independence  
The presumptions behind deference include a presumption that administrators operate largely 
benevolently in relation to legislative mandates, rather than in favour of certain social, economic 
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or political interests. The scholarship of Donald Savoie and others in political science raise 
important questions about these assumptions. The administrative state encompasses diverse 
actors, ranging from tribunals and prosecutors to political actors like Ministers. Thus, the concept 
of bureaucratic independence is at best fluid and uncertain.179 Certainly it is debatable whether a 
range of tribunal and non-tribunal Canadian administrative decision-makers have any noteworthy 
indicia of independence and neutrality, including such features as merit-based appointment, 
security of tenure, whistleblower protection, and a duty of loyalty to the Crown or to the public 
interest more generally (overriding a duty of loyalty to the government of the day).180 
For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to note that there is a very broad spectrum of 
independence, along which an administrative decision-maker may be anything from a direct 
political actor to a non-political actor, such as a tribunal, with some measure of independence 
and impartiality. There are no clear guarantees of independence or impartiality for most 
Canadian administrators. Some commentators have suggested that a lack of independence, for 
example a decision made by or controlled by Cabinet, could lend “democratic legitimacy” that 
justifies deference.181 For example, certain types of policy decisions may require “political 
judgment” and therefore be delegated to Ministers. Another explanation for why powers might 
be delegated to Ministers (even if exercised by delegates) instead of independent administrators 
is that the legislature intended a measure of political accountability in the decision-making.182 
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The reverse is also potentially true because, on the one hand, an administrator that does have a 
large degree of independence (for example, a merit based appointment and security of tenure) 
might arguably attract less deference to counteract the lack of political oversight in their policy-
making functions and, on the other hand, the administrator might attract more deference because 
they were intended to replace judicial functions using expertise.183 Using “independence” as a 
contextual factor in determining the standard of review is problematic for these reasons. Yet, 
there is a potentially important relationship between the independence or neutrality of the 
decision-maker and the ability of that decision-maker to interpret the statute – neutrally, in good 
faith and in accordance with legislative intent on substantive issues of public policy – and to 
employ expertise in doing so. If deference doctrine is premised largely on practical justifications 
such as “expertise”, then the ability to rely on that expertise impartially and consistently, and 
without political interference, becomes significant. Arguably, the more expertise is relied on as a 
justification for deference, the more important the administrator’s independence and freedom to 
rely on expertise becomes. Administrative independence could help to ensure the actual 
influence of that expertise on decisions. Conversely, a lack of independence may have the result 
that political considerations trump expertise and legislative intent regarding policy outcomes.  
There are other benefits to impartiality and independence. Judicial reasoning and precedent 
provides a measure of consistency, transparency and clarity that permits the legislature to 
predict, at least to a limited degree, what policy outcomes its words – as set out in statutes – will 
likely have. Administrative decision-making that follows its own unique, apparently “rational”, 
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logic, with variable transparency, may not have this benefit. Further, once legislation is enacted, 
the judicial process ensures a measure of consistency in the interpretation of public law and, 
accordingly, equality before the law that may be absent from administrative decision-making, 
where there are usually no rules of precedent. Finally, independence and impartiality at least 
assist the Court in being better positioned to focus on what policy outcomes and meanings the 
legislature intended, as opposed to other considerations such as political expediency of the 
moment, budgetary limitations or internal bureaucratic or expert norms.  
The lack of independence and impartiality of many administrators may make them vulnerable to 
pursuing other non-legislative objectives, such as internal bureaucratic goals or the short-term 
political goals of the executive or central agencies. I do not suggest that independence and 
impartiality are the only considerations. Yet there is a striking absence of both academic and 
doctrinal discussion on the relative merits of independence and expertise in terms of 
administrators’ reliability in upholding legislative intent and employing expertise to do so. Daly 
raises this issue but concludes that there are principled reasons that could be raised both in favour 
of and against deference in relation to the degree of independence of administrators. He argues 
that, while independent administrators are less accountable to the political process, this does not 
merit more intense review where the legislature has otherwise intended deference.184 Daly does 
not address Dicey’s concern about whether a lack of independence could enable centralization of 
power in the executive. Such centralization, while arguably within the purview of the legislature, 
undermines the pragmatic rationales for deference based on expertise and complexity.  
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Given the lack of clear measures of independence for many Canadian administrators, the issue of 
independence weighs strongly in favour of the availability of judicial statutory interpretation on a 
correctness standard. While an administrator may have expertise in the policy behind the statute 
or technical matters, an administrator who is not at liberty to employ that expertise should not 
attract deference relative to a court. While de facto independence may be difficult to gauge in a 
particular case, the legislative indicia of independence should be identifiable. I do not suggest 
that this consideration would need to be a contextual factor employed on a complex spectrum in 
every case, but as a general matter it supports a presumption of correctness on questions of law 
that could be rebutted with legislative criteria. While some administrators are sufficiently 
independent to ensure that they are not controlled by the executive, the overall lack of concrete 
guarantees of independence (or even whistleblower protections for administrators) means that 
administrators are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for the executive to appropriate policy-
making functions that the legislature did not necessarily intend to delegate. This risk is most 
pressing in relation to questions of statutory interpretation. It is in statutory interpretation that 
administrators and the executive have the most important opportunity to go beyond the scope of 
delegation intended by the legislature. Thus, judicial statutory interpretation remains important 
as a check or balance against the interpretations of administrators who lack independence.  
Problems arising from real world decision-making 
Some policy decisions are subjected to political interference from the executive 
Some kinds of public regulation may be subversive of administrative order or of political and 
economic interests. After the legislature enacts public law, the political pressures and power 
imbalances between the winners and losers in the legislative balance that was struck remain 
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dynamic. The executive of the day may be unhappy with the balance struck by the legislature 
and may be subject to social and economic pressures to strike a different one. In an ideal world, a 
new balance would be struck through the legislative process, but this is not always the case. 
Sometimes the legislative process might open up such decision-making to unwanted public 
scrutiny. 
Many forms of public regulation are the result of a political compromise between limiting the 
potential adverse political, social and risk consequences of industrial capitalism and maintaining 
capitalism.185 Those compromises will likely remain hotly contested after legislation is passed. 
Administrators who are tasked with this balancing role have a potentially socially and 
economically subversive mandate. Their discretion could be exercised to suit different opposing 
interests. When operating in this context, the faithful fulfillment of a statutory mandate may have 
costs to the bureaucracy in terms of lowered budgets or even the elimination of their mandates 
altogether.  
 An example is environmental regulation in Canada’s resource sector.186 In this field of 
regulation, administrators may be particular targets for political interference by central 
agencies.187 Scholars such as Paehlke and Torgerson have argued that the administrative state is 
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embedded in the larger social context of industrial capitalism, which runs contrary to the goals of 
environmental protection. They argue that administrators tend to promote a “particular order” 
which serves industrial capitalism.188 This may run directly counter to environmental objectives. 
According to Paehlke and Torgerson, speaking about environmental regulation, the 
administrative state absorbs environmental objectives and critiques by casting environmental 
interests as an “expression of narrowly self-serving groups and individuals.” The task of 
administration is one of “containing and overcoming irrational resistance” to the “natural and 
necessary course of development.”189 Paehlke and Torgerson conclude that, while the low-
priority status of environmental management generally (and broader political, social and 
economic forces) contribute to the ineffectiveness of environmental legislation, administration 
also plays an important role.190 It should be no surprise then that bureaucrats and regulated 
entities might find their mandates “disordering” to preferred modes of decision-making or might 
consider some types of risk regulation to be unwieldy, unrealistic and administratively 
unmanageable.191 Such reactions to environmental legislation are common both inside and 
outside the public service.192 The history of bureaucratic resistance to federal environmental 
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assessment regimes in Canada is a well-researched example.193 Smith and Fenge have described 
that agencies “were able to water down” federal environmental assessment policy and that 
agencies with resource development mandates perceived environmental policies as “an 
unwarranted intrusion on their authority and freedom of action.”194  
There is also empirical research that should cause administrative law scholars to question 
whether the Weberian ideals about public administration are accurate, in so far as they see 
administrators acting largely above the political fray and based in technical expertise. The 
Professional Institute of the Public Service, the largest union in Canada representing scientists 
and professionals employed in both federal and provincial governments, surveyed its members 
on issues relevant to how the civil service administers the public administrative state and how it 
treats expert advice in that process. The survey found a great deal of political pressure on federal 
scientists and highlighted the dynamic, non-static nature of political pressure with surveys from 
both the Harper and Trudeau governments. In 2013, 86 per cent of the survey respondents said 
they felt they couldn't share concerns about health, safety or the environment without censorship 
or retaliation. In 2017, 73 per cent felt they were not free to raise these concerns. This pressure 
went beyond issues of public discourse into actual decision-making. In 2013, 50 per cent of 
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respondents said they were aware of cases where the health, safety or environment of Canadians 
was compromised because of political interference. In 2017, 23 per cent said they were aware of 
these types of cases. These are substantial numbers of federal public servants advancing concerns 
about political interference.195 In a recent investigation, the federal Information Commissioner 
confirmed that the survey was, in her view, accurate.196  
It is unclear how common political interference is and to what extent it impacts administrative 
decision-making inappropriately. Even so, legal scholars should be more mindful that there are a 
diverse array of problems for different categories of decision-makers and that the nature of 
administration is not singular or fixed over time. As a result, the general presumption that the 
administrative state is free to advance policy goals, relying primarily on expertise and without 
significant political interference, may not always be accurate. 
Some policy decisions are resisted by the bureaucracy itself 
Other scholarship tackles the social embeddedness of administrators outside the risk assessment 
context. Sossin examined administrative discretion in the context of Canada’s redistributive tax 
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investigation participants is consistent with the "chill" documented in the survey of over 4,000 federal 
government scientists conducted by the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada and 
reviewed by the OIC as part of this investigation.” 
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regime, which is arguably also subversive of prevailing economic and social forces. He 
questioned whether discretion can or does function in precisely the way that administrative law 
scholars appear to assume. He argues that nearly all discretionary decisions have a normative 
dimension and that: 
The roles that the administrators in the welfare state are called upon to perform 
cannot be neatly compartmentalized in the popular understanding of bureaucratic 
subservience to democratic political institutions, nor can they be properly 
legitimated on the basis of norm-free, rule-based technical expertise.197 
 
Sossin argues that administrative structures not only regulate the social and economic systems 
they govern but are embedded within them. In reviewing exercises of discretion of federal tax 
officials in Canada, he concludes that the overriding objective of tax enforcement officials – due 
to the influence of wealthy taxpayers in the enforcement system – appeared not to be to pursue 
the redistributive goals of income tax legislation but rather “to enforce complianc e as little as 
practicable while still curbing flagrant fraud.”198 Sossin’s analysis also highlights how an 
approach to judicial review that focuses on controlling the excesses of the administrative state 
and its impact on the individual functions as a potentially poor form of oversight, since it tends to 
exacerbate public sector biases against regulating powerful political and economic actors.199 In 
his analysis, he describes how tax officials attempt to avoid making politically controversial 
decisions, resulting in the odd use, or non-use, of enforcement discretion in controversial areas: 
Administrative discretion that is depoliticized in this fashion can be 
legitimated solely on the basis of expertise, impartiality, and 
instrumental reason; any form of administration which depends on 
                                                 
197 Sossin, supra note 159 at 14. 
198 Ibid at 17.  
199 Ibid at 18. 
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substantive justifications for discretionary judgments is thus 
effectively precluded.200 
 
What Sossin describes is a politically embedded administrative system with a socially and 
economically subversive mandate that must legitimate its decisions on apparently politically and 
normatively neutral grounds. This quest for neutrality reinforces avoidance of the pursuit of 
statutory regulatory mandates that are potentially controversial. Sossin notes that, while the idea 
of a neutral, apolitical and impartial administrator is a flimsy “legal fiction”, there is nothing to 
replace it: “[i]n other words, if officials cannot act neutrally, in whose interest and for what 
purpose should they act?”201 Among other reforms to the tax system, Sossin advocates for 
greater statutory clarity in order to confine discretion and for clearer normative goals to provide 
the administrator with a clear purposive mandate.202 Thus, alongside the characterization of 
administrators as neutral and rational experts administering complex policies, we have 
descriptions of this same apparent neutrality and rationalism that are said to be empty of 
substantive content when it comes to the normative goals for which the discretion is granted. 
This dynamic leaves a vacuum into which political and economic forces can enter.  
In this framing, formal rationalism in administrative decision-making therefore has the potential 
to be merely a legitimating mask for the use (or non-use) of discretion simply to avoid the 
appearance of controversy. Substantive legislative policy goals may well take a back-seat. 
Sossin’s analysis demonstrates that administrators may not always be fully interested in or 
comfortable with the role of regulatory policy-maker, or even policy implementer, that is implied 
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by the necessity and complexity justifications for judicial deference. Whether this aversion is a 
result of internal institutional pressures, social embeddedness or political pressure is not as 
important as recognizing that these phenomena are known to occur.  
Thus, even in the absence of “political” interference, there can be resistance to legislative 
mandates from within the administrative state. This can take the form to resistance to the 
political, social or economic outcomes of the legislation or to the deliberative democratic 
procedures that are disordering to administrative and political power structures. It is important to 
consider that administrators may not always be engaging in policy practices that are based in 
either expertise or legislative mandates.  
Summary – Critique of the practical justifications for deference 
The central practical justifications for deference, which will be revisited in the caselaw, are 
vulnerable to the accusation that they do not reflect how real-world decisions are made. They 
evidence a naiveté about the strengths and weaknesses of administrators relative to other state 
actors such as courts and legislatures.  
The necessity argument and related justifications, such as complexity and legislative incapacity, 
are key to justifying modern deference doctrine. However, they should be exposed as only some 
of many possible understandings of how the administrative state functions. By granting 
deference to administrators, courts risk granting deference to the core of the executive and 
central agencies of government. In doing so, they risk weakening the legislature’s control over 
public policy questions. In this sense, Dicey’s concern about executive arbitrariness and 
parliamentary supremacy remain relevant.  
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Administrative decision-makers may be working against the goals that the legislature intended a 
grant of discretion to be used for. They may be working in favour of other interests, both 
institutional or socio-political. Legal scholars should be more mindful that courts may be 
granting deference based on assumptions about the administrative state that might not be 
empirically valid or theoretically sound.203 They should draw more on scholarship from the 
social sciences about the nature of public administration.  
If the executive or other economic, social and political actors can pressure the civil service to act 
in ways not contemplated by the policies of the legislature, then the power of the legislature to 
control the nature of the powers it delegates is potentially significantly undermined, and with it 
democratic accountability. In practical terms, an example would be a case where there are 
popular changes to a law by the legislature, but administrators keep making decisions as if the 
change never happened. At its root, the issue is whether the rule of law and statutory law matter 
and to what degree the electorate and the legislature controls them. 
The implications of these problems for public regulation are significant. Deference must be 
understood in the context of its different tensions. First, deference plays a potential role in 
providing space for administrators to faithfully carry out statutory policy mandates. However, it 
also risks entrenching forces – both internal and external to administrative decision-makers – that 
might undermine those goals. We should strive to move beyond a naïve understanding of 
administrators and, in explaining why deference is accorded, do more than ask who is “best 
                                                 
203 Peter Gall, “Dunsmuir: Reasonableness and the Rule of Law”, (6 March 2018), online: Administrative 
Law Matters <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/03/06/dunsmuir-reasonableness-and-
the-rule-of-law-peter-a-gall-qc/>. 
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fitted”. We could ask instead how deference potentially maintains, promotes or undermines 
different aspects of legislative and executive power. What outcome is desirable is more than a 
question of judicial policy. The question has significant political and normative dimensions, as 
Dyzenhaus recognized. 
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Part 2 – Post-Dunsmuir explanations for deference 
The legal justifications for deference 
Despite the above commentary on Dunsmuir, not all of the justifications for deference 
underpinning current jurisprudence are pragmatic. At least some remain “legal” in nature. The 
legal flavour of the justifications for deference is also confirmed by the categorical exceptions to 
deference originally set out in Dunsmuir, which include questions of vires and constitutional 
questions. These legal justifications engage a broader debate about the separation of powers. 
What is the source of (or limits to) legitimacy for judicial review? Where does legislative power 
end and judicial power begin? For example, why should courts be able to override express 
legislative intent in privative clauses?204 Deference obviously engages with these issues because 
it attempts to resolve them by striking a balance between legislative and judicial power. The 
primary way that deference doctrine tackles this issue is by framing the issue in terms of 
legislative intent.  
Underscoring the importance of legislative intent to accord deference, Daly has called it “the 
declared constitutional principle” upon which his general theory of deference relies.205 In relation 
to all practical arguments for deference, he asserts that these must be linked back to legislative 
intent and that practical justifications for deference cannot be “free standing”. While Daly 
supposes that reliance on legislative intent used in this way is “neutral as between schools of 
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statutory interpretation”,206 arguably this approach to legislative intent is based on a particular 
method of statutory interpretation. The particular method is one that discounts the importance of 
privative clauses and rights of appeal as compared to contextual factors implying legislative 
intent to accord deference.  
Dyzenhaus argued that one of the reasons for the decline of the Dicey framework was that the 
use of privative clauses complicated an account of the rule of law that focused on legislative 
intent, as understood by judges, as the lynchpin of a theory supporting judicial oversight of 
administrative law.207 This complication arose from the legislature’s expression of its intent that 
administrators rather than the courts have the final say on statutory interpretation, through the 
use of privative clauses.  
The focus of such arguments is legislative intent with respect to deference and legislative intent 
to delegate policy-making functions to administrators. Legislative intent on the underlying 
legislative policy, or the purposes for which discretion is granted, is not the focus. Legislative 
intent normatively justifies deference by linking it to the decision of a democratically elected 
legislature. Legislative intent to accord deference is tied to whether courts must respect the 
boundaries set by the legislature in order to maintain fundamental constitutional order. By 
“respecting” the legislature’s “decision” to allow administrators to determine questions of law, 
deference is seen to uphold legislative supremacy. As phrased in Dunsmuir, “legislative 
supremacy is assured because determining the applicable standard of review is accomplished by 
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establishing legislative intent.”208 An interesting feature of this focus on legislative intent is the 
necessary assumption that legislatures turn their mind to this question, or that this question takes 
on importance or significance in the legislative process. It is unclear whether this is actually the 
case, particularly where there is no privative clause or right of appeal proposed that might form a 
nexus for legislative debate.209 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, by downplaying 
both rights of appeal and privative clauses where they are present, emphasizes “implied” 
legislative intent – in other words, pragmatic justifications – at the expense of a good faith search 
for legislative intent through classical statutory interpretation.  
How is legislative intent to accord deference established 
In the pragmatic and functional era, where the various contextual factors were weighed to 
determine standard of review, there was often a reasonably clear approach employed by the 
Supreme Court to establish legislative intent to accord deference.210 This approach looked at both 
express legislative intent, through an examination of privative clauses and rights of appeal, and 
contextual factors said to indicate “implied” legislative intent. No one factor was determinative. 
However, contextual factors were not really tied to legislative intent, but rather to practical 
justifications, which were employed in a particular legislative context.  
                                                 
208 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 57 at para 30 (emphasis added). 
209 A search of the terms “judicial review” or “privative” and “standard of review” in openparliament.ca 
provides only a handful of examples where primarily committee witnesses raise the issue. Also see 
comments in Martin Olszynski, “Dunsmuir is Dead – Long Live Dunsmuir! An Argument for a 
Presumption of Correctness”, (13 December 2017), online: Ablawg 
<https://ablawg.ca/2017/12/13/dunsmuir-is-dead-long-live-dunsmuir-an-argument-for-a-presumption-of-
correctness/>. 
210 A good example would be the approach in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v 
Southam Inc, 1997 CanLII 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748.  
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That the contextual factors were not really a search for legislative intent becomes clear when an 
express right of appeal or privative clause is present but not determinative. Under the pre-
Dunsmuir pragmatic and functional approach, the Supreme Court struggled with expressions of 
legislative intent regarding the standard of review itself in the form of a right of appeal or a 
privative clause. The Court’s focus under the pragmatic and functional approach favours implied 
legislative intent, wherein the existence of a specialized tribunal is itself seen as an indication of 
legislatively desired limitations on judicial interference. Strongly contextual and pragmatic 
justifications govern the level of deference owed, including “the purpose of the statute creating 
the tribunal, the reason for its existence, the area of expertise of its members and the nature of the 
problem before the tribunal.”211 
In Pezim and Dr. Q, the Supreme Court noted that the existence of a statutory right of appeal 
alone was just one factor to be weighed by the court.212 Legislative intent remains highlighted in 
Dr. Q as the organizing feature of the justification for judicial deference. However, in order to 
explain why a standard of review analysis is necessary in the face of a statutory right of appeal, 
the Supreme Court is necessarily identifying “the consequences that flow from a grant of 
powers” and avoiding “unnecessarily” employing reviewing power. This analysis is framed in 
terms of legislative intent (i.e. a legal justification for deference) but betrays an emphasis on 
pragmatic justifications for deference and judicial policy-making by distancing itself from 
legislative intent where decision-makers might be “better placed” or have an epistemic 
                                                 
211 Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), supra note 69 at 592 citing with approval 
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advantage. In Dr. Q, the Court claims that, in weighing these other contextual factors against an 
explicit statement of legislative intent to allow appeal to the courts, it is preserving the rule of 
law.213 Implicitly this “rule of law” is one that is focused on not frustrating the administrator’s 
role in interpreting the law. A similar view was articulated by Justice Wilson in National Corn 
Growers Association: 
[W]e must recognize (1) that [administrative] decisions are crafted by 
those with specialized knowledge of the subject matter before them; 
and (2) that there is value in limiting the extent to which their decisions 
may be frustrated through an expansive judicial review. 214 
 
Daly recently tackled the broader contextual problem in his treatise on deference. He argues that 
legislative intent is the key to understanding and justifying deference. However, he dismisses 
outright the lack of weight often ascribed to privative clauses, stating that privative clauses are 
necessarily “incoherent” and amount to the legislature stultifying itself. With echoes of the 
pragmatic and functional era jurisprudence, he argues that “legislative intent in general can have 
the same effect as a privative clause.”215 In other words, the courts must give effect to legislative 
intent, but legislatures cannot usurp the function of judicial review and so privative clauses are 
not determinative.  
There are significant challenges with this line of reasoning. Even if one accepts that there is 
always judicial discretion to engage in judicial review, notwithstanding the existence of a 
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privative clause, this conclusion does not resolve the issue of why other factors besides the 
privative clause are better indications of legislative intent on the very issue of standard of review. 
Arguably, it is a pure legal fiction that practical justifications for deference, through contextual 
factors such as the “nature of the decision” or “expertise”, are clearer and better expressions of 
legislative intent than a privative clause or right of appeal. More recently it has been suggested 
that instead of using privative clauses or rights of appeal, legislatures should simply articulate an 
express standard of review.216 The central apparent benefit of such an approach is that it would 
allow the courts to sidestep the doctrinal difficulty caused by ignoring privative clauses and 
rights of appeal. Yet, for the courts to direct the legislature how to express its intention on 
standard of review would seem to overreach the proper role of a court, and moreover, raises the 
question of whether contextual factors would simply once again overtake the jurisprudence. 
While Daly argues that reliance on pragmatic contextual factors are grounded in “implied” 
legislative intent, he admits that the concept of implied legislative intent is problematic in other 
circumstances217 and that, once implied, “virtually any intention at all can be imputed [to the 
legislature].” He goes on to note that implied legislative intent “does not give concrete guidance 
                                                 
216 At the recent hearing of the Supreme Court of Canada for the case of Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration v Alexander Vavilov, 2018 CanLII 40807 (SCC) it was argued extensively that all 
legislatures should be expected to explicitly state their preferred standard of review in a statute rather than 
using privative clauses or rights of appeal. The parties pointed to the British Columbia Administrative 
Tribunals Act as a model for such legislation, but see Brent Olthius, “Can we make it any clearer? BC’s 
experience with legislated standards of review” (2018) Ontario Bar Association Institute, online: 
<https://www.litigationchambers.com/lawyers/pdf/2018-01-22-legislated-standard-of-review.pdf>. 
217 Daly describes why courts should not use concepts such as implied delegation to the courts to answer 
legal questions to explain judicial review powers in the face of other expressions of legislative intent. 
However, Daly argues that courts should use implied delegation to administrators to explain deference. 
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as to the appropriate relationship between reviewing courts and delegated decision-makers.”218 
Speaking to the complex problem of who is best suited to interpret laws, he recognizes that: 
It might be perfectly plausible that the legislature would intend to 
delegate a legal question to a delegated decision-maker, or a factual 
question to a court. If the nature of the question is to be said to be 
related to legislative intent, it is necessary to make an assumption 
[about who the legislature intends will answer these types of 
questions]…But if these background assumptions are permissib le, 
surely other background assumptions can be introduced as well. 219 
 
Accordingly, Daly admits that the basis for making background assumptions about legislative 
intent, particularly regarding who is better suited to answer certain categories of decisions as 
between administrators and the courts, is not clear. Yet he argues that these same background 
assumptions employed through deference doctrine have the potential to enhance legislative 
power because judicial deference gives “guidance to the legislature as to how it might by statute 
further its objective to insulate a body from, or expose it to, judicial scrutiny.”220 Daly argues 
that the potential proliferation of background assumptions regarding legislative intent are 
“necessary”, but nevertheless “it becomes difficult to perceive whether courts are navigating by 
the polar star of legislative intent, or by some other source of light.”221 Ultimately, Daly 
acknowledges that implied legislative intent may be employed “as a vehicle for policy 
preferences which should be supported on other grounds.”222 Indeed, it would appear that 
implied legislative intent – in reality, a focus on pragmatic justifications – overtook a meaningful 
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search for legislative intent in the pragmatic and functional era. Thus, the legal justifications for 
deference, to the extent they rely heavily on implied legislative intent, have a weak foundation. 
This does not mean that contextual factors can never be a signal of legislative intent. Of course, 
standard statutory interpretation demands that a privative clause, right of appeal or even a clear 
statement on standard of review is a clause that must be read and properly understood in its full 
context. However, to have a strong legal foundation, the legal justifications for deference must 
have a clearer relationship with expressions of legislative intent on standard of review such as 
privative clauses or rights of appeal. Such clauses may be read in context, but they may not be 
read “away” entirely or ignored as “unclear” in favour of heavy practical justifications and 
presumptions.  
Evolution of the Court’s approach away from legislative intent 
As described above, in the pragmatic and functional era the courts began to weigh “contextual 
factors” or implied legislative intent so heavily that these practical justifications could overcome 
express legislative intent in the form of privative clauses and rights of appeal. After Pezim, the 
Supreme Court privileged implied legislative intent over express legislative intent.223 This 
approach allowed the courts to “assume the role of the legislature to determine when deference is 
or is not owed.”224 After Dunsmuir, the Court adopted increasingly presumptive deference and 
the focus shifted to what types of legislative features could rebut the presumption.  
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By adopting a presumption of deference, Dunsmuir initiated a shift away from legislative intent 
as a justification for deference based either on contextual factors or on express legislative indicia 
such as privative clauses or rights of appeal. Instead, the Court’s rhetoric increasingly spoke of 
presumptive legislative intent, which had to be overcome. Initially Dunsmuir asserted a 
presumption of reasonableness with specific categories of exceptions, but created a tension by 
suggesting that a contextual standard of review analysis (using both express and implied 
legislative intent) could still be applied. 
The foundations of presumptive deference rest almost entirely on pragmatic justifications rather 
than context or legislative intent. The Court battled over this issue shortly after Dunsmuir, where 
the majority of the Court held that no “statutory direction” was required to support deference.225 
Instead, the fact that “a particular decision had been allocated to an administrative decision-
maker” was sufficient to ground deference on facts, policy and law because “in many instances” 
administrators develop considerable expertise or field sensitivity to a legislative regime.”226 In 
strong dissenting reasons, Justice Rothstein argued that expertise (even where present) was not a 
free-standing basis for according deference.227 Rather, Justice Rothstein reasoned that the 
legislature was in a better position than the courts to determine expertise and that the legislature 
could signal its intent to accord deference for this reason or others using a privative clause.228 
Justice Rothstein changed his position entirely, shortly after Khosa, as author of the majority 
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decision in Alberta Teachers, where he adopted the view that it was no longer necessary to 
consider whether an administrative regime was specialized or whether an administrator had 
expertise, noting: 
Through the creation of administrative tribunals, legislatures confer decision-
making authority on certain matters to decision makers who are assumed to have 
specialized expertise with the assigned subject matter.229 
 
The result was a presumption of reasonableness for all administrators operating under their 
“home statutes”, whereby the home statute became a proxy for specialization and expertise. No 
contextual inquiry into the presence of expertise or specialization was necessary. Specialization 
and expertise were instead presumed as general justifications for the presumption of deference in 
Dunsmuir.  
Justice Binnie’s reasons in Alberta Teachers raised the concern that there was no contextual (or 
legislative intent) element to these justifications. He suggested that it did not make sense to 
employ this assumption of expertise and specialization outside “the context of elaborate statutory 
schemes such as labour relations legislation” in which it arose, where there was typically both 
specialization and privative clauses supporting implied and express legislative intent. He 
objected to the use of the presumption for all questions of law for all administrators under their 
“home statutes.”230 Justice Binnie does not seem to complete this analysis, however, and 
ultimately appears to accept the presumption, suggesting only that such a presumption could be 
rebutted where a legal question was outside the administrator’s expertise and was of general 
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importance.231 He also supported broadening the categories of questions of general legal 
importance.232 In justifying this position, Justice Binnie cited a passage from the Supreme 
Court’s 2011 decision in Mowat, stating that where the expertise of the administrator is not 
required to interpret a statute, “the last word on questions of general law should be left to 
judges.”233 
In a separate concurring judgment in Alberta Teachers, Justice Cromwell argued that the 
contextual approach continued to apply because it was fundamental to ensuring that the 
legislature intended deference on questions of law. First, Justice Cromwell asserted that “[t]he 
touchstone of judicial review is legislative intent” and that the primary question is not whether an 
exception in Dunsmuir applies but “whether the legislature intended that a particular question [of 
law] be left to the tribunal or to the courts.”234 Justice Cromwell explained that the contextual 
factors apply to determine this, asserting that expertise within the “home statute” is one of the 
factors.235 He cautioned against “elevating to a virtually irrefutable presumption the general 
guideline that a tribunal’s interpretation of its “home” statute will not often raise a jurisdictional 
question.”236 He argued that the legislature intends the courts to accord deference where there is 
                                                 
231 Ibid at para 83. The Supreme Court would later adopt, and still uses the “outside expertise and of 
central importance to the legal system” exception to the presumption of deference for example see 
Chagnon v Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, 2018 SCC 39 at para 17 in which 
the majority held, without any explanation, that parliamentary privilege fit this category with respect to 
labour arbitrators. Also see dissent at para 86. 
232 Ibid at para 84. 
233 Ibid at para 85, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 
[2011] SCR 471 at para 128. 
234 Ibid at para 96. 
235 Ibid at paras 97-98. 
236 Ibid at 92 
  
88 
a broadly worded statutory provision in a complex statutory scheme.237 Yet Justice Cromwell 
does not provide principled reasons why the presumption of expertise applies to all 
administrators operating under their home statutes in the first place, or why it should be rebutted 
by examining the breadth of the provision. It remains unclear how the other contextual factors 
could apply to rebut the presumption of deference, if at all. 
The upshot of the success of the majority position in Alberta Teachers was that, after Alberta 
Teachers, the tension between presumptive reasonableness with categorical exceptions, on the 
one hand, and the continued application of the contextual analysis that permitted a role for 
legislative intent, on the other hand, was resolved strongly against a continuing role for any form 
of analysis of legislative intent to explain deference. Legislative intent instead played a very 
limited role in explaining whether the presumption of deference was rebutted. Questions of 
rebuttal focus more on judicial policy than they do on legislative intent.  
However, the contextual approach did not disappear completely, creating considerable 
confusion. The Supreme Court would still in some cases purport to make an inquiry into whether 
the question of law resides within the core of an administrator’s expertise.238 On some occasions, 
legislative intent to accord deference would remain relevant where there is a right of appeal.239 
For example, in Tervita, Justice Rothstein held for the majority that a right of appeal or leave to 
appeal can rebut the presumption of reasonableness under Dunsmuir.240 In concurring reasons, 
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Justice Abella disagreed.241 The issue arose again in 2016 in Edmonton East (Capilano) 
Shopping Centres.242 In that case, while the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of 
strong statutory language rebutting the presumption of reasonableness, the Court found it was 
narrowly confined to “unique” rights of appeal.243 The majority held that the right of appeal in 
that case was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness. The majority left the 
door open to contextual analysis into legislative intent, while at the same time disparaging it as 
generating “uncertainty and endless litigation concerning the standard of review.”244 In a strong 
dissent, Justices McLachlin, Moldaver, Côté and Brown held that the standard of review was 
correctness.245 They resurrected to some extent the debate between the majority and Justice 
Rothstein in Khosa by asserting that the legislature “has a role to play in designating and 
delimiting the presumed expertise” of an administrator. They raised a concern that the majority’s 
approach simply presumed expertise was present and that this approach risked transforming the 
presumption of deference into “an irrebuttable rule.” The dissenting justices noted that “[r]espect 
for legislative supremacy must leave open to the legislature the possibility of creating a non-
expert administrative decision maker”.246 In an unusual move, the dissenting justices also found 
that the Board had a “lack of relative expertise in interpreting the law.” They advocated that the 
existence of a statutory right of appeal “in combination with other factors” can rebut 
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reasonableness and require correctness.247 However the dissent in East Capilano provides no 
methodology to rebut a presumption of expertise. Instead, it largely draws bald conclusions that 
“statutory interpretation does not fall within the specialized expertise of the Board, since its day-
to-day work focuses on complex matters of valuation of property.” Unable to clearly articulate 
how they know whether the Board is an expert in statutory interpretation, the dissenting justices 
fall back on calling it a “jurisdictional question” without further elaboration.248  
Increasingly, the debate at the Supreme Court has tended towards a majority that seriously 
questions whether the presumption of reasonableness can ever be rebutted, and a minority that 
advocates a “we know it when we see it” exception that ranges from being cast as jurisdictional 
to being cast as an “outside expertise” and a question of central importance to the legal system as 
a whole. Both the majority and the minority versions are problematic. The majority approach 
fails to address legislative intent in any meaningful way and effectively deprives the legislature 
of any reliable means to point to correctness. The minority, while asserting that rebuttal based on 
legislative intent must remain possible, consistently fails to articulate any statutory interpretation 
methodology to rebut the presumption, identify the scope or application of expertise, or identify 
expressions of legislative intent for correctness.  
Both approaches are ultimately devoid of clear, principled articulations for why reasonableness 
is presumed.249 If either legislative intent or practical justifications, such as expertise, are central 
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to the rationale for the presumption, then they must be key to any method of rebuttal. The current 
doctrinal approach largely displaces the role of either legislative intent or practical justifications 
in the rebuttal of reasonableness. Moreover, the conflict between various iterations of minorities 
and majorities at the Supreme Court exposes the problem of heavy reliance on presumed 
practical justifications and the sidelining of legislative intent.  
In arguing that legislative intent is central to deference, Daly has asserted that “the practical 
justifications for deference all contain flaws.”250 Specifically, he notes that expertise and 
complexity are not reliable indicators of whether deference is warranted. He argues that, if these 
justifications were not linked to legislative intent to accord deference, then “courts would have to 
address these potential flaws on a case-by-case basis”, an exercise that is impractical and outside 
the range of tasks for which judges are expert.251 The problem with this argument is that there are 
limits on how a practical justification, which may have nothing to do with legislative intent, can 
nevertheless remain “linked” to it. For example, if expertise is not signalled through a privative 
clause, as Justice Rothstein argued for in Khosa, then it is likely going to be free-standing and 
requires a contextual case-by-case analysis. It is unclear how else the legislature can reliably 
signal expertise, except perhaps by requiring specific qualifications or tenure for administrators. 
Unless expertise is only relied on in these narrow situations where there is a clear link to 
legislative intent, it will become free-standing and must be addressed in each case. The Supreme 
Court’s approach of treating expertise as both a presumptive factor and a free-standing basis for 
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deference simply cannot be sustained. The limited and methodologically ambiguous “escape” 
category of correctness for matters which are outside expertise and of central importance of the 
legal system is too unclear and unprincipled to address this problem. It fails to permit an 
explanation of why questions that are outside the expertise of the administrator should in some 
cases be accorded deference, but not other questions. Nor does it address the methodological 
problem of identifying the scope of the administrator’s expertise relative to the question before 
it.  
As Dyzenhaus recognized, the Court must ultimately choose whether in justifying deference 
from a principled perspective the Court is relying on legislative intent or whether, alternatively, it 
is relying on free-standing practical justifications for deference. If it is the latter, then the Court 
requires a methodology for determining what expertise is and when it is relevant to a question of 
law. The Court’s approach has continued to conflate the presence of practical justifications with 
the presence of legislative intent. By rendering the practical justifications presumptive rather 
than contextual, they are no longer plausibly connected to legislative intent. The presumption of 
deference has become so strong, and the exceptions to it so limited, that neither legislative intent 
nor the pragmatic justifications can explain why courts should show deference. Current doctrines 
would accord deference where neither a privative clause nor any indicia of expertise, complexity 
or specialization are actually present. The Court has never explained why all administrators can 
be assumed to have expertise in questions of law relative to the courts, such that their statutory 
interpretations should be left to stand where judges disagree. Further, even if administrators have 
such expertise, the Court has failed to explain why expertise should be a “free standing” 
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justification for deference, in the face of signals that the legislature might have intended 
otherwise. 
Summary  
Having criticized the Supreme Court’s current approach to deference doctrine, I do not advocate 
a retreat to a contextual approach to expertise. The arguments that expertise is too difficult to 
determine on a case-by-case basis are compelling. Clear legislative indicia on expertise are 
probably limited to statutory qualification requirements for administrators or perhaps indicia of 
independence such as security of tenure. Relying on these factors alone would serve as a 
potentially under-inclusive inquiry into potential administrative expertise. Yet other “contextual” 
approaches rely heavily on speculation and conclusory pronouncements. The same difficulties 
arise regardless of whether the inquiry into expertise occurs as part of the identification of 
reasonableness or in rebutting expertise as part of a rebuttal of the presumption of 
reasonableness.  
On the other hand, a purely presumptive approach to expertise – as a primary justification for the 
presumption of reasonableness – is unacceptable. For the reasons explained in my critique of the 
practical justifications for deference, there is no good reason to assume that administrative 
decision-making is, as a rule, an exercise that turns on the objective and rational application of 
specialized policy or technical expertise. Rather, the evidence suggests that such decisions may 
be just as likely driven by budgets, political interference, satisficing and other factors.  
In practical terms, this can lead to the undermining of legislative objectives. Where an 
administrator is interpreting and applying the law, in other words legislative policy, deference 
based in expertise assumes that the administrator is “best fitted” to understand that legislative 
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policy. Deference therefore strongly discourages courts from engaging in meaningful analysis of 
what the underlying legislative policy objectives of discretion might be. It also discourages 
courts from engaging with the alignment between the policy outcomes of administrative 
decision-making and legislative objectives. This can apply even where an administrator makes 
little or no effort to interpret the statute, but simply pursues policy outcomes the administrator 
thinks are best for other reasons.  
For example, in Vavilov the Supreme Court recently heard a case where a decision to deny 
citizenship to the son of  Russian spies born in Canada was made, and a very limited effort was 
made, entirely after-the-fact, to conduct an outsourced statutory interpretation analysis 
afterwards to explain the decision. The Federal Court questioned the expertise of the decision-
maker on questions of law and applied a correctness standard.252 However at the Federal Court of 
Appeal, expertise was not discussed and seems to be accepted. The Federal Court of Appeal 
presumed reasonableness, but the majority applied a very narrow form of reasonableness 
approaching correctness.253 In dissent, Justice Gleason held that the statutory scheme left it open 
to the decision maker to adopt the interpretation it did, as well as other interpretations.254 Despite 
a lack of discussion of expertise on questions of law, the key difference between the majority and 
the dissent that emerges in that case at the Court of Appeal is the extent to which they engaged 
with statutory purpose and text in applying reasonableness. Justice Gleason engaged in a 
standard reasonableness analysis which stopped well short of assessing what sort of outcomes 
                                                 
252 Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2016] 2 FCR 39, 2015 FC 960 at para 16.  
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the legislature might have intended, leaving it open to the administrator to grant Canadian 
citizenship for the son of one Russian spy, but not for another. Put another way, the dissent 
trusted the presumed expertise of the administrator on the question of law while the majority did 
not. 
The problem currently before the Supreme Court in Vavilov illustrates the problem of potentially 
allowing administrators to make essentially political or extraneous policy determinations – for 
example about the merits of discouraging Russian spies – implicitly or explicitly because 
statutory language is not crystal clear and the administrator is the expert in the statute. It is 
ultimately reasonableness doctrine, not the statute itself, or any clear legislative direction, that 
establishes that these determinations are a permissible part of decision-making. Applying 
reasonableness in the way currently advocated by the majority of the Supreme Court strongly 
discourages closing gaps in the statute through standard interpretive mechanisms, or emphasizing 
statutory purpose and intended legislative outcomes. The result is a potentially very wide 
discretion granted on even narrow issues of legislative policy implementation.  
Given that reasonableness doctrine rests so heavily on expertise, the potential absence of any 
such expertise – or at the very least the lack of a commitment to applying it to questions of law– 
creates serious problems: First, the outcome of decisions may be the opposite of what the 
legislature intended in terms of policy outcomes (ie. who should or should not have a right to 
Citizenship) as these are not given serious treatment; second, it can become practically 
impossible for the legislature to grant any discretion, or permit any ambiguity of flexibility in 
statutes without potentially undermining its own objectives; third, the lack of accountability to 
either expertise within reasonableness or the statute’s wording and purpose can create serious 
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inequality between those subject to administrative discretion, allowing opposite outcomes on 
similar facts to be reasonable. 
Similar problems arise under risk management regimes. Administrators making risk management 
decisions may have before them issues that are predominantly scientific or factual with a 
narrowly framed standard to meet255 – or they may have discretion to make complex policy 
decisions on risk, constrained primarily by general legislative purposes.256 Presumed expertise as 
a justification for deference provides little or no room for meaningful accountability on factual 
findings, nor for judicial scrutiny of whether legislative objectives are advanced by particular 
decisions. Applicants have no clear method of addressing the use or non-use of expertise on 
either facts or legislative policy issues to rebut the presumption, or demonstrate 
unreasonableness.257  
An alternative solution is to retreat from expertise as a practical justification for deference on 
questions of law.258 The reliance on the expertise of administrators on questions of law is an 
                                                 
255 A potential example can be found in the Pest Control Products Act, SC 2002 c 28, s.2(2). 
256 See for example the purpose provisions to “promote sustainable development in order to maintain a 
healthy environment and a healthy economy” and to “avoid significant adverse environmental effects” 
etc. in Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52, s.4, combined with broad 
decision-making provisions in s.52. 
257 The Federal Court of Appeal decision in Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 
FCA 114 is an example where neither the language of the provisions nor the purpose of the statute are 
discussed in any detail in assessing reasonableness. Further, the Court of Appeal refused to review the 
facts or reasoning of the administrator beyond the procedural merits of the decision, relying heavily on 
presumptive expertise. 
258 Such a solution was recently proposed by David Jutras and Audrey Boctor in their amicus factum 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov v Attorney General (Canada). However, I do not 
advocate their solution which is to replace presumed expertise with presumed institutional competence, 
which would amount to the same result. 
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over-correction and over-reaction to historical judicial limitations in applying legislative purpose 
in the labour law context. The advantages of judicial statutory interpretation have merit and 
deserve to be given additional weight. As will be shown below, these arguments are augmented 
if one digs deeper into what it means to show deference on questions of law through the 
application of a reasonableness standard.  
In so far as the Supreme Court now pays lip service to legislative intent, while effectively 
ignoring most rights of appeal and privative clauses (or even contextual factors addressing 
implied intent), the Court lacks a clear legal justification for deference. The central justification 
is presumptive expertise, which cannot in practice be rebutted by any known method. Thus, the 
pragmatic justifications for deference are a shadow of their former role as implied indicia of 
legislative intent. They now persist largely as a background philosophical stance about the role 
of the administrative state relative to courts. Such heavy reliance on practical justifications such 
as expertise and complexity are problematic. The lack of contextualization in current doctrines of 
deference at the Supreme Court of Canada exacerbates those problems. 
As I discuss below, the lack of clear principled justifications for deference on questions of law 
considerably complicates the application of the reasonableness standard to questions of law. In 
particular, the heavy reliance on a background assumption of expertise and specialization in all 
administrators, as well as the assertion that all questions of law have malleable meanings or 
potential outcomes, serves to frustrate a robust understanding of how the courts should determine 
whether a decision is reasonable. Ultimately, I argue below that judicial statutory interpretation 
must play a clear and legitimate role in even deferential review.   
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Part 3 - the role of statutory ambiguity in justifying and defining reasonableness 
There are numerous conceptual, doctrinal and practical problems with the application of the 
Court’s post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence on the standard of review.259 My focus in this section is on 
doctrinal problems in applying reasonableness to questions of law. These problems flow from the 
legal and pragmatic assumptions used to justify deference. First, the legal justifications for 
deference, namely the court’s approach to legislative intent, creates methodological problems in 
applying deference that lead to a presumption that public law statutes are ambiguous. Second, the 
practical justifications for deference, such as expertise, risk being used as a full answer to the 
question of whether an administrative decision is reasonable. Third, the justifications for 
deference taken together can result in rationality being equated with reasonableness, unbounded 
by the statutory context in which discretion is granted and untethered from the factual record 
before the decision-maker. 
The presumption of statutory ambiguity 
The ambiguity of a statutory provision has since CUPE been held to be an indicia that the 
legislature intended deference. Ambiguity is taken as a signal that the legislature delegated 
policy questions to the administrator and that the legislature intended the administrator, not the 
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courts, to decide those policy questions.260 Broadly worded provisions or explicit policy 
questions are said to confirm that reasonableness is the proper standard. In Dunsmuir the 
majority held that reasonableness entails the idea that “there might be multiple valid 
interpretations of a statutory provision or answers to a legal dispute and that courts ought not to 
interfere where the tribunal’s decision is rationally supported.”261 In Khosa this concept of 
multiple interpretations or statutory ambiguity was further relied upon to explain presumptive 
deference.262 This reliance raises the question of what method the Court employs to determine 
that the statute “might” be ambiguous. As with the other contextual factors discussed above, 
while initially framed as a contextual factor leading to a finding of legislative intent for the 
courts to accord deference, the existence of statutory ambiguity as a contextual factor is now 
largely presumptive.  
For example, in McLean the majority of the Supreme Court linked deference to “the resolution of 
unclear language” in the home statute. The majority reasoned that “the choice between multiple 
reasonable interpretations will often involve policy considerations.” The existence of these 
“policy considerations” then supports a presumption that there is legislative intent to accord 
deference. The administrator is also said by the majority to have “expertise” in those policy 
considerations.263 This analysis harkens back to John Willis’ view that administrators are better 
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positioned to give a purposive analysis that interprets statutes in alignment with legislative intent 
on questions of policy.  
Yet the Supreme Court does not appear to have a consistent methodology for determining when 
a statutory provision is “ambiguous” in administrative law. In most cases, the Supreme Court 
starts by doing its own statutory interpretation and then determining whether that statutory 
interpretation leads to the conclusion that the statute permits multiple reasonable interpretations. 
If it does not, then there is no meaningful difference between reasonableness and correctness on 
questions of law. Yet the method the court should employ for reaching a conclusion on 
ambiguity is difficult to determine from the existing jurisprudence.264 
In McLean, the Supreme Court explained that the first step in applying reasonableness is to 
determine whether the statute “permits of multiple reasonable interpretations” using “ordinary 
tools of statutory interpretation.”265 If multiple reasonable interpretations are permitted, then the 
administrative decision-maker “holds the interpretive upper hand” and deference requires that 
the court “defer to any reasonable interpretation adopted by the administrative decision-
maker.”266 The Court goes so far as to opine that “[j]udicial deference in such instances is itself a 
principle of modern statutory interpretation.”267  
However, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in administrative decisions 
diverges significantly from that used in other contexts. In its leading case on statutory 
                                                 
264 Daly, supra note 147. 
265 McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), supra note 238 at para 38 [emphasis added]. 
266 Ibid at 40. 
267 Ibid at paras 38–40. 
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interpretation, the Court held in Bell ExpressVu that it was a legal error to start from a belief that 
there is statutory ambiguity.268 The Court asserted that there “is only one principle or approach” 
to statutory interpretation.269 In that case, the Court held that the broader context of the provision 
and a full understanding of the intentions expressed in the statute must be considered before a 
Court determines that a statute is “reasonably capable of more than one meaning.”270 Where that 
is the case, then the next step is for the Court to resort to external interpretive aids, including 
other principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the ambiguity.271 Crucially, the Court held 
that ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that different courts or doctrinal writers have 
reached different conclusions on interpretation.  
The Supreme Court in McLean fails to explain why the Court should start by using ordinary rules 
of statutory interpretation, but then stop short of resolving (or attempting to resolve) any 
ambiguities using the same rules to apply deference. It is also not clear at what point a court 
should stop in its statutory interpretation analysis. Does it stop before the use of interpretive aids 
or after? The Supreme Court does not address how it is that it will determine if a statutory 
provision is so ambiguous that it cannot have a single meaning. More importantly, the approach 
of starting with statutory interpretation appears to contradict the purpose of according deference, 
to the extent that deference is accorded in light of the administrator’s supposed advantage, using 
expertise, to understand the meaning of technical terms and legislative intent in context. It is 
clear that the Court’s approach in McLean would have the Court do its own inquiry into 
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legislative intent. Once such an inquiry is deemed necessary, it becomes unclear why deference 
based on expertise would then be granted at some later point in the statutory interpretation 
analysis. Fundamentally, the issue is whether the Court can trust the administrator on these 
broader contextual and policy questions of interpretation.  
A variation on this approach was used in Mowat.272 However, in that case the Supreme Court did 
explain how administrative expertise in the statute was employed in the analysis. In the case, a 
human rights commission determined that it had the authority to award costs under its home 
statute. Although it did not explicitly use the method later set out in McLean, the Supreme Court 
started in Mowat by conducting a de novo statutory interpretation exercise and then determining 
whether the commission’s interpretation fell within this exercise.273 Regarding the commission’s 
interpretation, although the commission decided that it had costs authority in the case at hand , 
the Court held that the commission had consistently expressed the view that its statute had no 
authority to award costs and had repeatedly asked that the statute be amended to include costs 
authority.274 Based on its statutory interpretation exercise, the Court held that the commission’s 
interpretation was relevant to judicial statutory interpretation, but not determinative.275 It held 
that there was only one reasonable interpretation of the statute and that the commission’s 
determination that there was authority to award costs was unreasonable.276 The approach in 
Mowat is also used in Wilson v. BC, where Justice Moldaver concluded that the scope of 
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permissible interpretation would be determined using Driedger’s rule, in that case finding that 
the adjudicator’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable and was the only reasonable 
interpretation.277 The Court in Mowat held that it was improper for the commission to interpret 
the statute consistent with what it considered to be “a beneficial policy outcome” rather than in a 
manner that was most consistent with the intent of the legislature (i.e. judicial canons of 
interpretation). In this approach, the Court still starts with statutory interpretation (as in McLean). 
Yet in Mowat, unlike in McLean the Court does not ask “is the statute ambiguous” and then 
proceed to determine if the administrator’s interpretation fits within the permitted area of 
ambiguity. Instead, the Court incorporates the administrator’s interpretation into its judicial 
exercise in statutory interpretation. The administrator’s view of the statute is given weight, but is 
not determinative. This contrasts with the approach in McLean to the extent that, once a “space” 
of ambiguity is found, the administrator’s view of the statute is determinative, so long as it 
resides within that space.  
The approach in Mowat appears to provide very little deference to the policy expertise of the 
administrator in interpreting its statute. The court’s reluctance to place a “beneficial policy 
outcome” determination above what the legislature intended results in a need for judges to 
independently assess legislative intent and then measure this assessment against the 
administrator’s interpretation. Where the policy preferred by the administrator conflicts with the 
legal reasoning around legislative intent, the latter prevails. This sequencing begs the question of 
why to bother giving purported deference to administrators on questions of law at all. If 
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administrators cannot be trusted to pursue outcomes that are consistent with legislative intent, 
then surely courts must intervene by interpreting statutes themselves. Even so, Mowat is 
attractive in that it purports to promote a method that would at least consider the policy rationale 
of the administrator as part of a judicial statutory interpretation analysis. In Mowat, the Court 
tries to consider the administrator’s interpretation as part of the overall context of the enactment. 
This seems to balance judicial rationality more precisely against respect for the policy expertise 
of the administrator, including expertise in the statute. However, in the end, the Court rejects that 
pure policy considerations are within the administrator’s purview where they conflict with the 
usual canons of statutory interpretation. Ultimately, the result is the same. Judicial statutory 
interpretation defines the space within which administrators can address questions of policy. If 
there is no space, there is no actual deference on questions of law. 
Similarly, the McLean approach starts by ignoring the administrator’s interpretation altogether. It 
then permits the administrator a choice between interpretations that the Court deems to be 
reasonable using its own analysis, or perhaps no choice.278 While this approach respects the 
application of consistent canons of statutory interpretation, it shows a lack of respect for the 
administrator’s presumed expertise in understanding statutory purpose. As a result it begs the 
question of why it is necessary to show deference and, more specifically, what policy advantage, 
if any, deference provides administrators in the arena of statutory interpretation.  
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The alternate approach, of starting with the administrator’s analysis and then gauging 
reasonableness, is equally problematic.279 First, many administrators provide no analysis related 
to the meaning of a statute, and a forensic exercise to try to understand what the statutory 
interpretation analysis might have been can be very artificial.280 Further, even where an 
administrator does provide enough analysis of a statute’s meaning, which a court can use as a 
starting point for its own analysis, the administrator is unlikely to employ the same statutory 
interpretation techniques as the court would use. Thus it is unclear what methods a court should 
use to assess whether the administrator’s interpretation is reasonable. The Supreme Court has 
suggested that other methods might still lead to reasonable conclusions, but it remains unclear 
what those other methods are and how they can be assessed. One might argue that the Court 
should take the administrator’s interpretation on its face and assess only whether it is “rationally 
supported” by a justification that may have nothing to do with judicial canons of interpretation, 
in other words an “administrative” rationality as an alternative to judicial rationality.281 However, 
if that were done, it is unclear what kind of “rational support” would be permissible, and with 
what method a court could assess it. As I have argued above, this model can easily slip into a 
substantively empty review that ensures no accountability to either substantive legislative 
objectives or expertise. If the Court were to employ some kind of “other” method of statutory 
interpretation, what would it be and what would its justification be in public law, in contrast to 
other contexts where the usual canons of statutory interpretation would apply?  
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To a large extent, the Supreme Court has attempted to address this dilemma by noting that 
administrative rationality is assessed against both the reasoning and the “outcome.” The 
reference to outcome presumably imports some degree of substantive analysis, but what methods 
the Court is using to assess a reasonable “outcome” is not apparent. To date, most of the 
substantive analysis has turned on an interpretation of legislative purpose. Absent a detailed 
inquiry into the question of legislative purpose, there is little against which a court could assess 
the reasonableness of the outcome without resort to a pure policy analysis. Again, once the court 
is looking in detail at legislative purpose, a fundamental advantage that is supposed to be 
provided by deference is lost: that of allowing the administrator, rather than a court, to engage in 
the policy balancing.282  
Crucially, it remains unclear what should happen if a court disagrees with the purposive analysis 
of the administrator about the policy underlying the statute. In other words, the fundamental 
labour arbitration question underlying CUPE returns. Should the court assume that the expertise 
of the administrator in the policy behind the statute should rule the day or not?  
By employing de novo interpretation, including in the purpose of the statute, the Court implicitly 
overrides the administrative expertise that underpins the rationale for deference in the first place. 
At a further level, it remains unclear whether courts should follow the same approach in non-
administrative law cases, and presume that statutes are not ambiguous and attempt to resolve any 
ambiguities. If the Court should not attempt to resolve ambiguities, this raises the question of at 
when they should stop attempting this. The Court fails to explain why it should use a different 
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statutory interpretation method in administrative law cases. It also remains unclear whether 
statutes in administrative law will tend to be found to have broad ambiguity, therefore permitting 
multiple reasonable interpretations, or whether they will usually be found to be unambiguous. 
In the Court’s decision in Wilson v Atomic Energy, Justice Abella seems to argue against the 
principle in Bell ExpressVu and employs a presumption to circumvent these problems. She 
opines that in administrative law statutory ambiguity is the norm, not the exception, stating that 
“[e]ven in statutory interpretation, the interpretive exercise will usually attract a wide range of 
reasonable outcomes.”283 This position suggests that if the Court is to start with a statutory 
interpretation exercise it should “usually” stop well short of resolving any ambiguity. It begs the 
question of whether the Court should engage in statutory analysis at all, and if so, how much. 
While the tools of statutory interpretation are not an exact science, they are arguably directed at 
finding the best interpretation, which we then refer to in administrative law as the “correct” 
interpretation.284 They are, if imperfect, at least a consistent set of tools and principles to guide 
interpretation. The Supreme Court’s approach since McLean asserts that, in employing these 
tools, a court may in some cases be unable to find a single interpretation that is correct,285 but 
that in some cases it will be possible.286 This is a very surprising conclusion. The Court gives 
little doctrinal justification for why the tools of statutory interpretation work to provide legal 
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finality and certainty about legislative intent in private law but not public law, and in the latter 
realm only some of the time.  
Standard tools of statutory interpretation usually allow a court to find a clear expression of 
legislative intent on questions of policy (i.e. resolve the meaning of a statutory provision) where 
there is no administrative decision-maker in first instance. If the Court is capable of doing so, 
then a clear justification is required to refrain from doing so only where there is an administrative 
decision-maker in first instance. The decision-maker in the first instance should be irrelevant to 
whether a statute is ambiguous.287 The same public law statute may come before the Court via a 
tribunal or an administrator or through a private action. Bell ExpressVu for example dealt with 
legislation that the Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission regularly interprets in 
the first instance and regarding which the CRTC would normally be afforded deference. Another 
good example is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ewert, in which the statute came before 
the Court in an action for Charter damages and was interpreted on a standard of correctness, 
without any standard of review analysis, whereas the same issue would have been subject to 
reasonableness on judicial review if no Charter damages were claimed.288 Thus, because public 
law statutes may have both administrative and non-administrative dimensions, it is significant 
that there could be different rules for interpreting different parts of the same statute, or even the 
same part of the statute in different contexts. It is not compelling to simply respond that the 
concept of deference to administrative decision-makers, writ large, justifies this approach to 
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statutory interpretation. This question goes to the issue of whether deference is justified on 
questions of law in the first place. Traditional justifications for deference are premised on the 
administrator being able to reach a “better” or truer or more accurate interpretation than a Court. 
The concept of statutory ambiguity undermines this to some extent by divorcing the 
administrative interpretation from legislative intent and accepting the possibility of multiple 
reasonable interpretations of the statute that are all equally open to the administrator. Each 
interpretation is equal and the choice between them begins to seem worse in that it has a great 
potential for arbitrariness. In this scenario it becomes unclear why a Court choosing one of the 
reasonable interpretations based on an attempt to determine legislative intent is inferior to the 
administrator choosing one of the reasonable interpretations. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions demonstrate that it is at best highly unpredictable whether a 
statute will be said to be ambiguous. For example, in Agraira the Supreme Court held that the 
term “national interest” was not ambiguous and had only one reasonable meaning when read in 
its statutory context. The Court held that it must defer to the Minister’s implicit interpretation of 
what is in the national interest on the particular facts, but the Minister’s implicit interpretation 
accorded with ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.289 As a result, the Court avoided finding 
that the statute was ambiguous, since the Court was able to discern a specific meaning for 
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“national interest”.290 However, in the same year, the Court found in McLean that another statute 
was ambiguous and allowed for multiple reasonable interpretations. This finding was key to the 
application of reasonableness. McLean concerned the meaning of “the events” in the limitation 
provisions of securities legislation. The Court found that the statute was ambiguous and that both 
the appellant’s and the Securities Commission’s interpretations were reasonable and consistent 
with the outcome reached through ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.291 Thus, the Court’s 
approach to determining when a statute is ambiguous was somewhat unexpected; a broad, public 
interest-type provision regarding what was in the “national interest” (in Agraira) was found to be 
unambiguous but in McLean a narrow term in a limitation period – a provision whose very 
purpose was to give certainty to litigants – was ambiguous. The progression to the Court’s 
majority position in Wilson v. Atomic Energy, where statutory ambiguity is considered the norm, 
suggests the presence of a difficulty in applying statutory interpretation methods to determine 
whether a statute is ambiguous. It follows that the use of statutory ambiguity is highly 
problematic, both to signal that reasonableness is the appropriate standard and, in the case of 
reasonableness review, to determine any margin of appreciation on questions of law.292  
It is also important to question whether statutory ambiguity should be so central to according 
deference in the first place. According deference to an administrator in applying a statutory 
provision to a particular case does not necessitate that a statute is actually ambiguous. The 
Court’s fixation on this issue has led to the problem which existed in Wilson v Atomic Energy. In 
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that case, different arbitrators interpreted the same statute differently, with opposite results 
depending on the arbitrator. This inconsistency persisted for many years.  
Having committed the deference doctrine to a framework dependent on finding statutory 
ambiguity in order to accord deference, neither the majority nor the dissent in Wilson v Atomic 
Energy were able to see their way out of the problem. For the majority, multiple possible 
interpretations were reasonable and, for deference to work, the inconsistency in arbitrator 
practice therefore had to be acceptable. The dissent could propose only to carve out a correctness 
exception for persistent inconsistency, rather than challenge the fundamental issue of deference 
to statutory interpretation writ large.293  
More doctrinal problems in applying Dunsmuir were laid bare in Wilson v. Atomic Energy, 
which like Dunsmuir engaged the issue of dismissal without cause.294 The Court failed to 
provide clarity, issuing a split decision with three sets of concurring reasons and one set of 
dissenting reasons. The Court was unable to agree on the standard of review analysis, even 
though reasonableness as the standard of review was not contested by the parties. The Court was 
also unable to agree on how to apply reasonableness. In dissent, Justices Moldaver, Côté and 
Brown rejected presumptively deferential review under Dunsmuir as inconsistent with the rule of 
law and, in particular, values of consistency and predictability. They give great weight to the 
disagreement among labour arbitrators on the appropriate interpretation of the provisions, noting 
that this inconsistency undermines the rationale for deference. They would have set aside the 
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arbitrator’s decision. However, they largely tackle the issue not by fundamentally challenging the 
presumption of reasonableness or its application to statutory interpretation but by providing 
additional situations in which the presumption might be rebutted, namely persistent ambiguity.295 
The dissent in Wilson is incredibly important because it attempts to look explicitly to the 
rationales for deference and the values underpinning the presumption of reasonableness and to 
articulate how these rationales and values apply in the case of labour arbitrators who disagree. 
The dissenting justices question the fairness to the parties of permitting different labour 
arbitrators to reach different conclusions on fundamental issues of employment policy. Such 
differences in opinion, according to the dissenting justices, undermine the expertise and other 
rationales for deference.296 The dissent is alive to the doctrinal problem of how administrators 
can choose between different reasonable interpretations, noting that if expertise points in 
different directions, it isn’t clear what the basis for deference is: 
To accord deference in these circumstances privileges the expertise of the decision-maker 
whose decision is currently subject to judicial review over the expertise of other similarly 
situated decision-makers without any compelling reason for doing so.297 
 
Despite this, the dissent only carves out a correctness exception to reasonableness for situations 
where a statute is unambiguous.298 The rule of law value being promoted in the dissent is 
equality before the law but, for correctness to be available, the court must accept the premise that 
there is one “correct” way to interpret a statute which the court can intelligibly identify.  
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Neither the majority nor the dissent comment on the appropriateness of allowing the 
administrator rather than a Court to settle on one of the multiple possible reasonable 
interpretations of a statute. If a court is ultimately going to determine, and capable of 
determining a single interpretation that is correct, why should deference be shown to consensus 
decisions of administrators that are incorrect but reasonable?  
Once the door is opened, by acknowledging that courts are well positioned to resolve questions 
of statutory interpretation, there is no longer a strong rationale for granting deference for 
questions of statutory interpretation, whether administrators can agree amongst themselves or 
not. More importantly, the doctrinal explanation for why some statutory provisions can be 
understood by courts (and others are ambiguous and can be understood only by administrators) is 
left untouched. Wilson v Atomic Energy therefore exposes deeper flaws in the Dunsmuir 
approach of a presumption of deference on questions of law. The question of who is better at 
finding the best interpretation of the statute cannot be properly answered under this framework 
because Dunsmuir simply presumes the answer. Working within that framework, the justices in 
Wilson v Atomic Energy struggle to explain their conclusions. 
How do courts determine if a statutory interpretation is reasonable? 
As discussed above, there are two underlying assumptions about statutory interpretation in 
modern deferential review. The first is that the legislature intentionally creates statutory 
ambiguity so that no single correct meaning can be reached using standard canons of statutory 
interpretation. The second is that courts can use statutory interpretation to identify the scope of 
that ambiguity. I have questioned both of these assumptions. However, even if they are both fully 
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accepted, it would still leave the question of what methods are open to the administrator to 
determine the meaning of the statutory provision “reasonably”.  
We are left with the problem that, if the administrator uses tools of statutory interpretation, the 
administrator using an ambiguous statute will continue to get multiple possible answers. How 
does an administrator act reasonably to select one interpretation over the others? One possible 
response is that the administrator’s expertise in the policy of the statute allows the administrator 
to select “a” reasonable interpretation. But the necessary implication is that there is some other 
method to interpret statutes – some sort of special “administrative rationality” – that can and 
should resolve any residual statutory ambiguity.  
This thesis, that there is some method of administrative rationality, is difficult to support with 
any evidence. Even if it is assumed to exist, there is the remaining issue of why administrative 
rationality is preferred to judicial reasoning. Is it better able to resolve statutory ambiguity, 
therefore enhancing rule of law and equality before the law? Or does “administrative rationality” 
pave the way for proper delegation of policy decisions and, if so, is it because this form of 
rationality employs expertise? These questions are difficult to answer. For example, it could be 
argued that “a policy choice is only a policy choice if the choice is made between policies which 
are equally consistent with and supportable by the legislation.”299 In other words, it is unclear 
how much flexibility there is within administrative rationality. 
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The majority in McLean asserts, not only that administrators are better positioned to interpret 
statutes in accordance with legislative intent on issues of policy, but also that there may be 
multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute, all equally aligned with legislative intent.300 
Because there is ambiguity, the administrator has discretion to adopt “any interpretation that the 
statutory language can reasonably bear.”301  
However, if we accept that there are not just multiple possible but also multiple reasonable 
interpretations of the statute, as the Court repeatedly asserts, then it becomes unclear how the 
administrator choses between multiple reasonable interpretations and why the selected 
interpretation has normative or legal legitimacy over the others. If they are all reasonable 
interpretations, then presumably relative expertise supports all of them. This vexing result is 
evident from the Court’s willingness to defer to administrators who chose “any” reasonable 
interpretation, including opposite or conflicting ones. As Justice Côté points out in her dissent in 
Wilson, it is unclear why the court defers to one expert over the other in that case.302 Put another 
way, if expertise does not lead to the single best interpretation of a statutory provision, but only 
to one of multiple reasonable interpretations (all equally valid), then why is the chosen 
interpretation worthy of deference and why is expertise useful? The purpose of deference ought 
to be to ensure that Courts don’t misinterpret statutes because they don’t understand them to 
allow administrators to choose the best interpretation using their expertise. The purpose ought 
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not to be to ensure that administrators are free to interpret statutes as they see fit, regardless of 
the best interpretation. 
This observation returns us to expertise as a justification for deference. The Court’s approach to 
statutory interpretation is only understandable where administrative expertise is accepted over 
statutory policy. Expertise operates in the background as a primary explanation for why the 
interpretation selected by the administrator is acceptable and entitled to deference by courts, 
rather than the court selecting another reasonable interpretation that is potentially better. Yet 
expertise cannot explain how a single interpretation is reached or why it should be accepted 
where multiple interpretations are reasonable.  
What then is the relevant rationale for deference? Deference depends on a theory that 
administrators are experts in the policy of a statute and are supposed to be better placed 
(following the logic of John Willis) to give a purposive interpretation of statutory provisions.303 
The classic example is the labour arbitrator who better understands collective bargaining 
provisions and how they balance employer and employee interests. Yet this example does not 
require a court to find that there are multiple meanings of a statutory provision. It requires only 
that the administrator is “better placed” to find the single or most purposive, and therefore most 
reasonable (and arguably correct), meaning of a statutory provision.  
Yet, if an administrator’s decision can be understood in this way, it could paradoxically also be 
understood as being in full accordance with judicial reasoning using ordinary tools of statutory 
interpretation. Those tools require a provision to be read in its context and in a purposive manner 
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with regard to legislative history and context. Somewhat ironically, if the decision-maker 
explains the approach taken, and if that approach is purposive and in accordance with the overall 
policy of the legislation, then it will accord with Driedger’s rule and so with modern judicial 
approaches to statutory interpretation. Any relative expertise that the administrator had in 
interpreting the statute becomes irrelevant and deference is rendered unnecessary. If one 
combines judicial statutory interpretation with respectful attention to any reasons given on 
questions of law by the expert administrator – such that those reasons inform the Court’s 
understanding of the policies behind the statute – then the rationale for full deference on 
questions of law all but disappears. The traditional rationale for deference is consistent with a 
view that administrators may be better at applying the purposive aspects of Driedger’s rule than 
courts. However, it is not consistent with the view that they employ some other legitimate 
method. In turn, an administrator’s reasoning should be used or considered by courts, but there is 
no clear need for courts to defer where they use a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  
Admittedly, in some cases the legislature leaves much unsaid in relation to the objectives of a 
broadly worded statutory provision and that administrators are thus entrusted to breathe some life 
into those provisions. That this is the case in some instances, though, should not require that 
there will “usually” be multiple acceptable interpretations in deferential review or that, as a 
question of method and outcome any reasonable interpretation should stand. Take for example an 
issue where an administrator determines whether a decision is in the public interest. There may 
be multiple outcomes arising from particular facts from which an administrator may choose with 
reference to the public interest. Yet this prospect does not lead automatically to the conclusion 
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that the meaning of “public interest” is itself ambiguous, such that it is an enigma to be solved by 
the administrator alone.  
The meaning of public interest must be understood in the context of the enactment where it is 
found. This context includes the broad objectives or values that the administrator is required to 
balance in decision-making. It does not follow, however, that judicial canons of statutory 
interpretation cannot guide what a reasonable interpretation of a statute is and therefore which is 
best. This conclusion explains why the Supreme Court routinely applies its own purposive 
analysis to statutory provisions and, in turn, it appears that the administrator’s decision is being 
assessed against Driedger’s rule of statutory interpretation, with a purposive lens.304 
This approach is most common when no reasons or thin reasons are given by the 
administrator.305 Where the administrator’s reasons provide deeper insights into the purpose 
behind the statute, into the policy issues arising from the statute, or into the technical nuances of 
its terms, there is no reason judges cannot use these insights to inform their analysis. The 
question for the application of deference is whether those insights should merely be given weight 
and considered by the court or whether the court can (or should) diverge from them if it 
disagrees. A willingness to disagree with the administrators approach is essentially the approach 
the Supreme Court took in Mowat. However it could be improved upon by providing greater 
clarity regarding how administrative interpretations of statutes can be incorporated into judicial 
statutory interpretation. A modified approach from Mowat could have the benefit of utilizing the 
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expertise of the administrator, where present, and where reasons are given, to ensure that judicial 
statutory interpretation is well-informed.  
Of course, a method that attempts to use administrative expertise to inform judicial statutory 
interpretation, rather than defer to it, will be at risk of failing in situations where a court gets the 
purposive analysis completely wrong. This risk is exacerbated where the administrator employs 
non-legal reasoning or provides no reasons at all on statutory interpretation. The potential 
solution can be found in promoting or requiring transparency in the reasoning of administrators. 
Judicial submission to any “reasonable” statutory interpretation is not the only possible solution. 
With an approach that uses informed statutory interpretation, rather than complete deference to 
any reasonable interpretation, the administrator’s policy and purposive expertise, where evident 
from its reasons, can be given weight but will not be determinative where legislative intent 
appears to conflict with the administrators determinations. In turn, a “black box” of expertise will 
not be allowed to decide the outcome. Further, the assumption that a statute be considered 
“ambiguous” will not be needed to afford administrators with poorly defined arenas of 
discretion. 
Interplay between transparency and reasonableness 
An administrator’s interpretation of a statute should not be deferred to where the administrator 
does not use its expertise to explain in a coherent manner how its interpretation better gives 
effect to legislative policy, or employs a better understanding of technical terms. In other words, 
the rational and substantive basis for the decision to select a particular interpretation of a statute 
must be evident. The absence of reasons on a question of law entails a material risk that the 
decision is improper. For example, an administrator may be employing irrelevant considerations, 
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misunderstanding the purpose of the statute or the policy behind the enactment, or deliberately 
subverting the intention of the legislature because the administrator disagrees with the policy in 
the statute, as was arguably true in Mowat. At a minimum, administrative decisions require a 
basic level of transparency to attract deference. Where expertise is applied, and can be explained, 
judges certainly should give it weight. However, ultimately judicial review plays the crucial 
function of ensuring that there is alignment of administrative decisions with legislative intent on 
questions of overall purpose and policy. It cannot play this function if presumed “expertise” 
becomes a complete answer to whether a decision is reasonable. In short, in administrative 
statutory interpretation expertise should not be permitted to undermine legislative intent. 
An administrator that does not give reasons articulating how it interpreted a statute cannot be 
“better placed” to give a purposive statutory interpretation. Two factors favour a court as better 
placed in this respect. First, administrators may lack independence in relation to their mandates, 
resulting in interpretations that may serve purposes other than the legislature’s statutory 
objectives. For example, the case described by Sossin of tax collectors using their discretion to 
avoid prosecuting powerful entities where it will strain their resources while seeking to enforce 
strictly against ordinary taxpayers.306 In such cases, there are resource and other motivations that 
may be in play. Alternatively, Savoie describes situations where the interpretation may be shaped 
by Cabinet or a central agency’s political agenda.307 In such cases, deference to statutory 
interpretation may undermine the legislature’s fundamental objectives. The interpretations are 
determinations not of experts but of non-experts with agendas that are potentially divorced from 
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the mandate of the agency or the statute. It is unclear why deference should be accorded to such 
interpretations. 
Courts can generally be assumed to have less interest in how resources are expended or in the 
views of the government of the day, relative to administrators. While judges may be alive in 
some cases to such concerns, they are not embedded within the administrative system and not 
directly subject to pressures arising from within that system. While judicial interpretations may 
not accord with the way things “operate in practice,” judicial interpretations have greater 
political distance than administrators and therefore freedom to engage with what the legislature 
intended. Legislative intent is the focus of judicial statutory interpretation. Courts also have 
expertise in using clear criteria to try to determine legislative intent. Administrators close to the 
subject-matter they regulate may lack this and may be more concerned with what they, not the 
legislature, think is good policy. This epistemic deficit of administrators may be particularly 
apparent where they do not in fact interpret the statute or give reasons for their implied 
interpretation.308 Surely, the presumption that an administrator has used expertise to arrive at an 
appropriate and reasonable interpretation of the statute could be rebutted by the failure to 
interpret the fundamental meaning of a key provision on which the decision rests. Similarly if an 
administrator cannot explain how it applied the provision to particular facts, or if it shows no 
insight into the technical meaning of its terms, then this too should rebut any presumption of 
expertise. 
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Thus, there is a middle ground where administrators that demonstrate some insight into their 
statutory scheme through compelling reasoning are accorded “respectful attention” in matters of 
statutory interpretation,309 but administrators that fail to accord with ordinary tools of statutory 
interpretation are not accorded deference. In Southam, Justice Iacobucci cited with approval a 
relevant passage: 
Experts, in our society, are called that precisely because they can arrive 
at well-informed and rational conclusions. If that is so, they should be 
able to explain, to a fair-minded but less well-informed observer, the 
reasons for their conclusions. If they cannot, they are not very expert. 
If something is worth knowing and relying upon, it is worth telling. 
Expertise commands deference only when the expert is coherent. 
Expertise loses a right to deference when it is not defensible. That said, 
it seems obvious that [appellate courts] manifestly must give great 
weight to cogent views thus articulated. 310 
 
Of course, this approach presents the risk that the courts will ignore the administrative logic 
behind decisions altogether or that they will significantly misinterpret legislative intent. Judges 
do have weaknesses, not only in the policy of the statue but also for being in a demographic, 
class, ethnicity or gender positioning that could have significant biases on questions of policy. 
There is no question that this consideration was a major issue pre-CUPE. It will continue to be 
problematic today or in the future. The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest judicial 
perfection in understanding legislative intent or policy. However, there is no question that judges 
are situated very differently from administrators, in terms of the expectation of impartiality, the 
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availability of appellate review, independence and level of distance from the immediate 
pressures of practical bureaucratic concerns or political forces. 
It is an oversimplification and overcorrection for Courts to shy away from their role in 
adjudicating administrative legality because they might make mistakes. Where they do, so long 
as they are clear in their interpretive reasoning, so long as they reason in accordance with known 
and established statutory interpretation principles, and so long as they are attentive to legislative 
intent, there will be potential legislative and even appellate remedies available. In contrast, where 
administrators are permitted to select one of multiple reasonable interpretations based on 
unknown principles, it is unclear how legislative reform can address mistakes. Mistakes by 
courts or administrators are unavoidable; the question is how administrative law can best allow 
the legislature to fix them. The known canons of judicial statutory interpretation have significant 
advantages in this regard, compared to an idea of administrative rationality that is potentially 
inconsistent or relies on unknown principles. 
Without a requirement for reasons that articulate how the expertise of an administrator was 
employed in interpreting or applying a statute, deference as respectful attention is unjustifiable or 
impossible, or both. Deference in such circumstances requires a repudiation of the two pillars of 
legislative intent and expertise, upon which the fundamental rationale for deference rests. In the 
absence of reasons the administrator’s interpretation is either unknown or non-existent. The 
Supreme Court’s approach of implying reasons by reviewing the record is judicial review by 
speculation. If an administrator does not interpret its own statute, the administrator cannot fairly 
be said to be employing expertise or to have an epistemic advantage in doing so.  
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Expertise serves as a compelling rationale for deference in statutory interpretation where it is 
actually used to engage an interpretive upper hand. If the administrator does not explain its 
decision, deference becomes empty. Administrators are not judges and it is fair to observe that a 
clearly reasoned statutory interpretation cannot be expected in every instance. However, the issue 
is not whether this outcome can be fairly expected of administrators. The issue is what approach 
should be used when the administrator fails to provide reasons on statutory interpretation or 
those reasons are wanting. Should the Court assume that the administrator employed expertise 
and piece together an “implicit” interpretation, as was done in Agraira? The difficulty with that 
approach is that inevitably this implicit interpretation must be upheld against some standard and 
the only one available will come from judicial statutory interpretation, since the administrator 
has provided no alternative. In practice, the court will need to interpret the statute anew. Once 
the Court has done this, the benefit of comparing that interpretation to an administrator’s implied 
interpretation is very questionable.  
A hybrid approach to statutory interpretation that uses an administrator’s reasons to inform the 
purpose of a statute or the technical meaning of its terms is of course potentially foreclosed by 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to require reasons after Alberta Teachers311 and Newfoundland 
Nurses.312 While the Court has retreated somewhat since Delta from an approach that infers and 
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implies reasons, it has stopped short of actually requiring reasons for a decision on statutory 
interpretation to be reasonable. After Delta, judicial supplementation of reasons is only 
acceptable where reasons are insufficient or are not given because the issue was not raised before 
the decision-maker.313 In Delta, the Court emphasized that “reasons still matter” and that the 
outcome cannot be the “sole consideration”.314 However, the absence of a requirement for 
reasons on statutory interpretation undermines the role of transparency and intelligibility that are 
held out as central to deference under Dunsmuir. A meaningful role for transparency in 
reasoning would entail a duty to give at least minimal reasons. Instead, this stage of the judicial 
review analysis is really more concerned with the outcome. In other words, deference will 
operate to uphold a decision that could have been reasonable, with different or better reasons for 
it being made. The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to tie it back to the 
justifications for deference. It applies deference for a presumed expert who is unable to explain 
the decision-making process or rationale. It also applies deference to potentially irrational 
decisions that happen to have “worked out alright” from the reviewing court’s perspective.315 
Whatever the practical merits of this reasonableness without reasons approach, it is difficult to 
find a principled basis for it that coincides with the core practical justifications for deference. In 
other words, it fails to ensure that expertise is employed, or needs to be employed, to interpret a 
complex statute. Instead, it undermines expertise as a rationale for deference by assuming that 
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expert reasoning has taken place. Further, by assessing the “outcome”, it is not clear how the 
Court is applying deference and against what judicial criteria the outcome can be considered 
reasonable, other than the fact it was made by a presumptive expert. In this way, expertise can be 
determinative of reasonableness without accountability to expert reasoning. 
Does reasonableness have substantive content? 
The Court’s post-Dunsmuir approach to substantive rationality reflects certain presumptions 
about administrators having expertise that grants them a superior understanding of the facts and/ 
or the application of the law to the facts. However, this approach risks expertise becoming a 
complete answer to the question of whether a decision is reasonable in light of the facts, not just 
the law as set out above. On this view, the administrator’s legitimacy is sourced to a practical 
rationality in administering the public good: 
The code by which public law undertakes its work is … generated by 
the tensions and trade-offs involved in sustaining this network of social 
co-ordination. In this light, the basic law of the administrative state is 
a type of disciplinary law. All governmental action becomes 
reviewable in the light of a means-end rationality, the precise 
specification of which is determined by the institutional remit and 
competence of the particular official agency.316 
 
Yet it remains unclear whether formalistic, abstract rationalism is all that is needed to make a 
decision reasonable. Reasonableness should be guided by substantive content, such as broader 
social norms or statutory purpose and context. In other words, does the administrator have full 
purview over a “means-end” rationality or can the means and the ends both be bounded by 
external forces? The Dyzenhaus and Dunsmuir framework suffers from a lack of clarity about 
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the “legal standards” to which administrators are or should be held. Must these standards be 
sourced in legislative intent, for example in legislative purposes, and to what extent can they 
draw on broader values? When we speak of rule of law in the context of deference, does it have 
any substantive content or is it achieved by pragmatic rationality in the absence of substantive 
standards?  
For example, Allan has advocated that the legal standards underpinning the rule of law are moral 
standards which protect fundamental individual or constitutional rights.317 When courts engage 
in extensive statutory interpretation, with a view to discerning broader legislative policies and 
values underpinning a grant of discretion, this should not be considered an improper form of 
judicial review or dismissed as correctness in disguise. To do so is to ignore that rationality and 
reasonableness inherently has a substantive dimension. Absent any such analysis, a “reasonable” 
decision can be perverse so long as it is logical.  
In the absence of well-established legal principles about individual liberty or constitutional 
rights, it is more difficult to identify what “legal standards” may legitimately be employed in 
judicial review and their source. This is relevant to administrative law decisions about risk 
regulation where the values that might potentially guide the understanding of legal standards are 
not anchored in individual liberty or constitutionality but rather on broader social values around 
managing risk which may be, (but are not always) expressed through statutory purposes. In such 
cases the minimum requirement ought to be that the legislative purposes of risk regulation are 
sought out through judicial reasoning, and informed, where possible by administrative expertise. 
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Admittedly, this is a fought exercise, as discussed earlier in this thesis, the purpose of risk 
regulation can alternately be understood as legitimating the persistence of risk or an attempt to 
reduce or eliminate risk. However, in many cases, there is at least some legislative signal 
pointing towards one or the other as being a dominant purpose. 
That the exercise in assessing reasonableness against substantive values might be fought or 
difficult does not justify a deferential review that avoids it altogether. If the use of discretion 
becomes disconnected from the social norms that motivated the legislature to grant the discretion 
to administrators this undermines the legislative role in policy-making. Without any substantive 
grounding, the legal standards that define when a decision is “reasonable” risks being nothing 
more than a standard of formal rationalism, largely empty of substantive content and potentially 
disconnected from legislative objectives and the norms that motivated the legislature to grant 
administrative discretion.  
Ultimately, if deferential reasonableness review is to be linked back to the practical and legal 
justifications for deference discussed earlier it must have some substantive content. It cannot be 
an empty vessel, filled by the expertise of the administrator. Even in a broadly worded or 
“ambiguous” statute, the normative context and legislative purpose in which the ambiguous 
statute operates must play a functional role in deferential review. Tolerance of a lack of 
substantive content risks allowing administrators an arena of non-accountability that is very 
broad. The lack of substantive content could allow considerations that are absurd or completely 
irrelevant to be determinative, such as an administrator’s preference for jelly doughnuts over 
sprinkles, so long as the decision was formally reasoned and the administrative discretion broad 
or ambiguous enough. While permitting administrators room to determine which factors in their 
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decisions are relevant may seem admirable, there must always be some external substantive 
standard, or perspective within which the discretion is operative, or reasonableness will have 
retreated to pre-Roncarelli formalism.  
Any approach to deference that is not permissive of a legitimate role in judicial statutory 
interpretation, deprives the courts of a clear basis upon which to engage in a substantive analysis. 
Judicial substantive review must inevitably start with legislative purpose and an attempt to 
understand that purpose in context. Deferential review should likewise abandon the concept of 
statutory ambiguity, which creates an artificial arena of discretion by arbitrarily stopping a court 
from completing its own interpretation of the statute. Such an analysis is key to ensuring 
substantive accountability for administrators. 
The current post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence does a poor job of theorizing how administrators can 
or should mediate between different reasonable interpretations or applications of a statutory 
provision. Presumed expertise cannot be a complete answer to this question. The twin concepts 
of statutory ambiguity and expertise are in reality doctrinal crutches which are used to avoid the 
problem of substantive reasonableness.  
The Supreme Court’s approach to reasonableness is highly unsatisfactory in so far as it engages 
the tension between, on the one hand, recognizing that administrators may legitimately interpret 
statutory provisions and, on the other hand, applying the modern rule of statutory interpretation. 
It also fails to provide a coherent system for courts to hold administrators accountable on 
substantive grounds related to the fulfillment of legislative intent on questions of policy. 
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Conclusion 
The practical justifications for deference need to be moderated by a more complete 
understanding of the potential strengths and weaknesses of modern public administration. No 
matter how committed one is to the idea that the legislature can or must delegate broad policy 
questions to the administrative state, the contrary risks of untrammelled discretion or an 
unaccountable administrative branch of government must be managed in some coherent manner 
and cannot be dismissed entirely. The delegation of discretion must be for some discernable 
lawful purpose and should have discernable legal boundaries, using consistent methods. 
A self-policing administrative state entails social risks, the most important of which is that the 
legislature is sidelined, and executive power is potentially entrenched. The legislature’s role in 
public law should not be limited to giving policy discretion to administrative bodies who may, to 
varying degrees, be de facto agents of the executive. The same legislative grants of discretion 
may then have no policy content other than the meaning that is given to them by administrative 
decision-makers. Doctrinally and theoretically, the problem is left outstanding because a 
consistent methodology for statutory interpretation in deferential judicial review is not available. 
The current approach also threatens to undermine key values such as rule of law and equality 
before the law, as recognized by the dissenting decision in Wilson v Atomic Energy.318  
The key mischief wrought by the current doctrinal framework for deference on questions of law 
is that the legislature is highly constrained in its ability to control administrators or guide their 
                                                 
318 Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., supra note 283 at paras 81-87. 
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decisions. This is particularly so where future scenarios are difficult to predict and uncertain and 
therefore administrative flexibility is required for statutory goals to be advanced. Environmental 
management, health and safety regulation and other risk management processes are prime 
examples. Perhaps ironically, these are areas in which technical expertise is important to 
administrative decision-making. Instead of supporting the use of technical expertise, deference 
doctrine therefore puts legislatures in a bind where, if they rely on flexibility and technical 
expertise they are potentially stripped of their ability to direct policy outcomes. They are stripped 
by the doctrinal resistance of courts to look deeply at legislative purposes and statutory language 
on deferential review and to hold administrators accountable to legislative goals.  
The Supreme Court has adopted a very limited view of legislative supremacy, one that entertains 
a legislature as existing only to delegate to administrators. This view does not give enough 
weight to the important role of legislatures in policy-making and of transparent democratic 
policy debates. It also does not adequately address the risk of executive or administrative bodies 
acting arbitrarily, and contrary to legislative policy objectives, or the risk that they will become 
unaccountable to the legislature or the legislative policies they are to carry out. 
In terms of doctrinal reform, I do not propose that reasonableness as a standard needs to be 
dispensed with. I also do not propose that decisions that do not turn on questions of law should 
be reviewed on a correctness standard. Yet the pragmatic and legal rationales for strong 
deference to administrators on questions of law, as a universal approach, are weak. Courts must 
develop doctrines that are sensitive to the diversity of independence and mandates of 
administrative decision-makers, to the issue of whether administrators have provided reasons for 
their legal interpretations, and to the potential fallacy of purely pragmatic justifications.  
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Both the practical and legal justifications for relying heavily on deferential review for questions 
of law are also weakened if one adopts a more robust understanding of public administration. 
Deferential review may fail to ensure that legislative objectives guide administrators in matters 
of policy. Courts can and should act as arbiters of legislative policy constraints for grants of 
administrative discretion. Deference “as respect” ought not to mean that reasonable decisions can 
be unmoored from the purposes for which discretion was granted.  
In the course of writing this thesis, many administrative law scholars published works 
considering the impact of the Dunsmuir doctrine over the past decade. 319 In December 2018 
Supreme Court also heard two appeals in a case that may reform the law of the standard of 
review in Canada. 320 Dissatisfaction with the Dunsmuir framework appears to be growing, with 
some appellate courts in near open revolt on the level of review for questions of law.321 It is clear 
that tensions are rising between those social actors who are historically seen as benefiting from 
the administrative state, who are increasingly opposed to deferential review, and the 
administrative agencies that benefit from deference.322 These timely debates go well beyond the 
                                                 
319 Paul Daly and Leonid Sirota eds, A Decade of Dunsmuir (Toronto: Carswell, 2018). The final 
publication was not available to me during editing, so I have cited to the blogs which pre-published this 
material. 
320 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Vavilov and Bell Canada et al v Attorney General of 
Canada. 
321 Garneau Community League v Edmonton (City), 2017 ABCA 374; and Bell Canada v 7265921 
Canada Ltd., 2018 FCA 174. also See for example David Stratas, supra note 249; David Stratas “A 
Decade of Dunsmuir: Please No More” (March 8, 2018) Administrative Law Matters (blog) online: 
<https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/03/08/a-decade-of-dunsmuir-please-no-more-
hon-david-w-stratas/> and David Stratas, “Looking past Dunsmuir: Beginning Afresh” (March 8, 2018) 
Double Aspect (blog) online: < https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/03/08/looking-past-dunsmuir-beginning-
afresh/>. 
322 Supreme Court of Canada, Factums on Appeal: Case 37748 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v 
Alexander Vavilov (2018) online: https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/af-ma-eng.aspx?cas=37748 in 
which a range of civil society interests from First Nations to prisoners advocates to tenants advocated for 
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ones offered here. However, the current discourse is increasingly consistent with my thesis that 
deference for questions of law has reached a point where it grants the administrative state too 
wide a purview of decision-making, with insufficient oversight. The changing dynamics of the 
debate also are consistent with my argument that real-world administrators function in complex 
ways which are not always contemplated by deference doctrine in Canada. However the 
Supreme Court responds to the critiques, I have attempted in this thesis to identify some root 
problems with the current doctrine’s treatment of administrators, how it justifies that treatment, 
and how the doctrine distorts the justifications for and the application of deference. Judicial 
review doctrine would benefit from a rekindling of the romance between courts and legislatures 
and from a more meaningful and robust exploration of legislative intent, statutory interpretation, 
and the normative dimensions of each. Courts should do more to defend legislative power from 
potential executive abuse, by holding administrative agencies accountable on questions of law. It 
will be interesting to see whether the Supreme Court of Canada will engage in extensive reform 
and to what extent it may determine it needs to salvage reasonableness review in that process. 
                                                 
more searching review on questions of law while nearly all of the tribunals and government agencies, 
along with the amicus argued for more deference or maintaining deference on those questions. 
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